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Preface 
This report presents the Danish contribution to the EU-funded project, Analysing Public Account-
ability Procedures in Europe, which was carried out between 2001 and 2004, coordinated by 
Simon Joss at the Center for the Study of Democracy at Westminster University in London, UK. 
 
The project has aimed to contrast the ways in which public accountability is practiced in different 
European contexts, both at a general, or national level, and within specific sectors, or policy ar-
eas. The ambition has been both scientific, in terms of improving the understanding of public ac-
countability, and advisory, in terms of providing certain advice for policy-makers and interested 
parties at the European level, as well as within the participating countries. We hope that the dis-
semination of the Danish contribution in this report can be of interest for both scientific students of 
public accountability, as well as practitioners within various Danish contexts. 
 
The project was initiated in 2001, and consisted of three main parts, or work-packages: initial pro-
files, case studies and comparative analysis. There were seven partners; in addition to Denmark 
and the United Kingdom, there were project teams in the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Lat-
via, and Portugal. 
 
The first chapter of this report is the Danish initial profile and was written by the project partner, 
Andrew Jamison, with the assistance of Terkel Møhl. The other chapters present the Danish case 
studies, which were carried out by Jesper Lassen (genetically modified food) and Karsten Bruun 
Hansen (waste treatment and local transport). Andrew Jamison assisted Hansen in the prepara-
tion of his reports. 
 
The final phase of the project was comparative and involves a number of cross-country analyses 
that have been jointly authored among the project teams. It is anticipated that the results will be 
published in book form in the near future. 
 
As Danish partner in the project, I would like to thank the members of the Danish team for their 
efforts and the European Union for its financial support. 
 
 
Aalborg, June 2004 
 
Andrew Jamison 
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By Andrew Jamison and Terkel Møhl 
 
 
Summary 
 
1. The recent change in government in Den-
mark has brought about a shift in what might 
be termed the regime of public accountability 
procedures. The strong interest in such mat-
ters as public participation and so-called 
green accounts that was so prevalent in the 
1990s has given way to a regime of public 
accountability procedures that emphasize fis-
cal accounting. 
 
2. The words public accountability do not 
translate directly into the Danish language, 
but tend to be thought of in terms of democ-
ratic control and democratic legitimacy. Five 
dimensions of public accountability have 
been distinguished in the Danish context - 
legal, fiscal, democratic, performance, ethical 
- that we combine here into a concept of re-
gimes, where emphasis is given to one or 
more dimensions over the others. There are 
also different types of insitutionalized proce-
dures for public accountability within the dif-
ferent systems (legal, political, economic), as 
well as more dynamic processes of what 
might be termed regime-formation, whereby 
shifts in emphasis among the different proce-
dures take place 
 
3. Danish public accountability procedures 
build on an historical experience, by which 
two fundamentally different political cultures 
were established, one based in the country-
side and one based in the cities. Separate 
ideologies, separate organizational forms and 
separate political parties came into being in 
the course of industrialization, and the two 
political cultures have shared power through 
most of the past 100 years through arrange-
ments of consensus-making and compro-
mise. As a society, Denmark has also been 
characterized by a strong interest in forming 
associations, and in conducting social and 
political experiments. 
 
4. Both the legal system and the political sys-
tem are marked by tendencies toward decen-
tralization and allocation of authority to the 
local level. In comparison to other countries, 
local activities play a significant role in public 
accountability procedures. There is little for-
mal separation between the government and 
the parliament, or, for that matter, between 
the legal and political systems, and there is a 
comparatively strong political influence within 
the private sector and the media. The strong 
role played in decision-making by informal 
consultations among interest groups and by 
negotiated settlements among different con-
stituencies can be considered an outgrowth 
of what has been referred to as a “corporatist” 
form of governance that Denmark shares with 
the other Nordic countries.  
 
5. Three different regimes of public account-
ability procedures can be identified over the 
past 30 years. In the 1970s and 1980s there 
developed a consensual regime, by which 
there was an overriding attempt to balance 
different interests by means of compromise 
and negotiation, which led to a number of 
new fora for decision-making, technology as-
sessment, and public participation. In the 
1990s, under the social democratic led gov-
Public accountability procedures in Den-
mark: initial profile 
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ernment, there was what we term a 
“greening” of accountability, with a number of 
new procedures being instituted in order to 
account for the environmental implications of 
various decisions. It is this regime that is in 
the process of being replaced by a neo-liberal 
regime, by which fiscal accounting is given 
precedence over all other kinds of public ac-
countability procedures. 
 
Introduction:  
a shift in regimes 
 
In November 2001, Anders Fogh Rasmussen 
led his liberal Venstre party to a resounding 
victory in the Danish parliamentary elections. 
At the same time, the then ruling social-
democratic party suffered its worst election 
defeat in some 50 years.  
 
Together with the strong showing of the anti-
foreigner Danish People’s party, the election 
victory of the liberal party changed dramati-
cally the composition of the Danish parlia-
ment, making it possible for the government 
to achieve a majority without the support of 
the social-democrats or any of the other “left-
of-liberal” parties.  
 
In other words, the parliamentary ground 
rules that had long been in operation, by 
which decisions were based on negotiation 
and compromise across the left/right ideologi-
cal divide, and which had led to a characteris-
tically pragmatic way of doing politics in Den-
mark, were altered. The new situation would 
provide the basis for what would soon show 
itself to be the starting point for the making of 
a substantial shift in regimes in relation to 
public accountability procedures.  
 
It is important to emphasize at the outset that 
Denmark, in almost all respects, is a country 
of two political cultures, one that is based in 
the cities (and, in particular, in the capital of 
Copenhagen) and one that is based in the 
countryside. While the life-worlds of public 
administration and industrial activity provided 
the basis for a cosmopolitan public sphere to 
become consolidated in Copenhagen in the 
course of the 19th and 20th centuries, the 
life-worlds of agriculture and food-processing 
provided the basis for a very different kind of 
public sphere  - and collective identity - to de-
velop in the countryside.  
 
Two rather distinct sets of institutional frame-
works were established, both in the political 
realm, but also in regard to science and tech-
nology (see Jamison 1991). And unlike many 
other countries, where the urban political cul-
ture tended to take on a hegemonic status in 
the course of industrialization and “post-
industrialization,” Denmark has continued to 
be divided in two, not least because of the 
economic significance of agriculture (it is said 
that there are four pigs for every one person 
in Denmark). As we shall see, this dualistic 
character of Danish society has contributed to 
the formation of a particular set of procedures 
to ensure and facilitate public accountability.  
 
On the one hand, in Copenhagen and some-
what later in the industrializing cities of Aar-
hus and Aalborg, the social-democratic party 
came to represent large segments of the pub-
lic within the political system. As in the other 
Scandinavian countries, a system of 
“corporatism” developed, with employers and 
employees sharing responsibility for govern-
mental decision-making, especially in relation 
to industrial policy. On the other hand, the 
liberal party, along with the left-liberal Radi-
kale venstre party, which split from the 
mother party in the late 19th century, repre-
sented large segments of the rural popula-
tion, who were dependent on agriculture and 
food-processing for their livelihoods.  
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A somewhat separate system of institutions - 
and public accountability procedures - came 
to be established, which left agricultural policy 
and related scientific-technological develop-
ment to the farmers and their political repre-
sentatives. Because neither of the two politi-
cal cultures were able to achieve dominance 
over the other, forms of consensual delibera-
tion and negotiated compromise became 
characteristic features of Danish governance 
(see Baark 1997). 
 
That is why the recent and ongoing shift in 
public accountability regime is so significant.. 
With its own parliamentary majority, the new 
government can replace the consensual re-
gime - which, for many observers and partici-
pants both inside and outside of Denmark, 
had come to be taken for granted - by an ex-
plicitly partisan, neo-liberal regime.  
 
Public accountability, which until 2001 had 
primarily meant efforts to ensure a democ-
ratic control over decision-making by means 
of multifaceted processes of participation, or 
“stakeholder involvement” in governmental 
activities, changed character. Since Novem-
ber, the procedures for public accountability 
are in the process of being reduced to a 
rather straightforward effort to satisfy the vot-
ers who support the current government and 
brought it into power.  
 
Among other things, the new government is 
seeking to do away with the “rule by experts” 
that, according to Fogh Rasmussen, had 
characterized the previous social-democratic 
government’s ways of making, and account-
ing for, its  decisions. Public accountability 
procedures had previously been based on 
efforts to involve different “publics” and, in 
particular, their representatives in govern-
mental decision-making. By doing away with 
a number of the previous government’s public 
accountability procedures, in particular a 
good many of its advisory councils and com-
mittees, the government claims that it is both 
able to save money, as well as eliminate the 
power and influence of the “experts”.  
 
Those opposed to the government’s policies 
have thereby lost much of their influence, and 
fiscal cost-accounting is to become the domi-
nant procedure for ensuring public account-
ability of decision-making.  
 
What is public account-
ability in Denmark? 
 
Before going further in our story, we should 
attempt to explain what “public accountability 
procedures” actually mean in the Danish con-
text. First of all, it should be noted that the 
words do not translate easily into Danish. In 
the terminology used by political scientists, 
public accountability tends to be referred to 
as both “democratic control” and “democratic 
legitimacy” (Halkier interview). In the most 
fundamental sense, these terms denote the 
ideas of policies decisions are made in ways 
that can be controlled by the general public 
and that decisions gain their legitimacy by 
being grounded in an idea of a “popular will”.  
 
However, when speaking of public account-
ability procedures, one should note that while 
some are primarily related to the aspect of 
control, which would involve such matters as 
transparency and openness in decision-
making, others are primarily related to legiti-
macy, i.e. the ways in which various social 
interests and interest groups are represented, 
and involve such matters as access and par-
ticipation in policy-making.  
 
Where the one type of public accountability 
procedures tend to be formally codified in le-
gal documents, the others tend to be more 
informal and tacit in character, taken for 
granted or assumed rather than formulated 
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 explicitly. Another way to think of the differ-
ence between the two types of Danish public 
accountability procedures is in terms of a dis-
tinction between institutions of public ac-
countability, on the one hand, and processes 
of public accountability, on the other. 
 
What is common to both types of procedures 
in the Danish context is that issues of public 
accountability are discussed in the wider pub-
lic sphere, as well as in more specific or cir-
cumscribed public spaces, in connection to 
general, and usually rather vague, notions of 
democracy. Decisions, government agencies, 
political processes, laws etc. are labelled ei-
ther undemocratic, or democratic, but the ex-
act meaning of these terms is more implicit 
than explicit. For our purposes, we can say 
that  democratic practices involve procedures 
of public accountability, while undemocratic 
practices do not. 
 
The political scientist Lotte Jensen (2001) dis-
tinguishes between five dimensions of public 
accountability: 
 
• Legal: To what extent do actors comply 
with normative prescriptions? 
• Fiscal: To what extent do actors spend 
public money the most effective way? 
• Performance: To what extent do actors 
meet the goals articulated by elected politi-
cians and the expectations they have cre-
ated in the public domain? 
• Democratic: To what extent do actors re-
spect democratic values and enhance de-
mocratic processes? 
• Ethical: To what extent do actors behave 
in accordance with codes of ethics and 
general moral standards? 
 
In this list of accountability dimensions, de-
mocratic accountability does not enjoy any 
especially privileged position over – or apart 
from - the other dimensions, whereas in the 
general way in which the idea of public ac-
countability is thought of in Danish, democ-
ratic control and legitimacy are core ele-
ments. 
 
Jensen describes how the Ministry of Finance 
has succeeded with normatively constructing 
and institutionally underpinning fiscal ac-
countability as a prime source of democratic 
accountability and by the same token en-
hance its position in the continual governance 
game in the Danish polity (Jensen 2001, p. 
479).  
 
The important point here is that public ac-
countability is treated as a unifying concept 
that covers various dimensions of account-
ability. But how do these dimensions relate to 
each other? One dimension may be subordi-
nate to other dimensions of public account-
ability in a specific context – they may even 
be in conflict with each other and priority may 
be given to one dimension, which downplays 
or neglects the others. 
 
For instance, the newly elected liberal Danish 
government has announced, as we have 
mentioned, the abolition of a range of govern-
ment boards, councils and committees with 
the objective of cutting down government ex-
penditures, among these, the Human Rights 
Centre. The Centre was established to serve 
as an independent body to monitor violations 
of human rights in Denmark.  
 
This example shows that the fiscal account-
ability dimension has been given priority over 
other dimensions, and, in particular, the ethi-
cal accountability dimension (in Jensen’s 
words: “accordance with codes of ethics and 
general moral standards”). The abolition of 
the various institutions is part of a set of 
openly declared goals that the new govern-
ment has declared should be met within the 
next election period, thus constructing an im-
age, or expectation that the new government 
is “performance accountable.” 
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 As argued by Wolf, the interplay between the 
various dimensions of public accountability 
should be understood as a “web of account-
ability relationships”: 
 
In this ‘web of accountability relationships’ 
different authorities give priority to different 
types of accountability with conflicting behav-
ioural expectations. Priorities can change 
over time, and even the ‘dormant’ types of 
accountability can still be invoked in particular 
circumstances. Reform will often involve a 
shift in emphasis among different types of 
accountability leading to an even higher risk 
of confusing or conflicting expectations (Wolf 
2000, p. 18). 
 
Whereas Wolf’s description of “public ac-
countability dynamics” may have some truth 
to it, the notion of “web” in relation to different 
dimensions of public accountability may be 
too imprecise in describing how the dimen-
sions actually relate to one another in prac-
tice. To get public accountability procedures 
in action, we will suggest a concept of 
“regimes of public accountability procedures” 
that are constructed in relation to specific po-
litical conjunctures and contextual conditions. 
For instance, the consensual regime empha-
sized democratic and ethical accountability, 
while the emerging partisan, or neo-liberal, 
regime emphasizes fiscal and performance 
accountability. The point is that, at least in 
Denmark, different people give emphasis to 
different dimensions of public accountability, 
and that the opposing views about these re-
gimes of public accountability procedures 
give rise to political controversy and conflict. 
 
Historical background 
 
Where do the concepts and normative ideas 
of public accountability come from? There are 
a number of historical experiences and cul-
tural traditions that have provided what we 
might term the cultural basis for the formation 
of public accountability procedures in Den-
mark. As we have already noted, industriali-
zation took a particular form in Denmark in 
that it was, to a significant extent, based in 
agriculture.  
 
As such, economic development in Denmark 
since the nineteenth century has reflected a 
somewhat unique experience. Endowed with 
few natural resources or minerals compared 
to many of the other European nations which 
started industrialization at around the same 
time, Denmark built its economic prosperity 
on exports of agriculture or agro-industrial 
processing (cf. Senghaas 1982). As recently 
as the late 1950s, almost two-thirds of Danish 
commodity exports came from agriculture or 
food-processing. 
 
In terms of ideology and political culture, the 
activities and role played by NFS Grundtvig 
are important to mention. Perhaps in no other 
country has one individual had such a con-
tinuing presence and influence in the public 
consciousness over the past two hundred 
years as Grundtvig has had in Denmark. 
Through his voluminous writings, from hymns 
to histories, from political speeches to reli-
gious tracts, as well as in the institutional ac-
tivities that he inspired, Grundtvig helped ar-
ticulate an indigenous form of modernization 
that served to appropriate industrialization 
into Danish contextual conditions in a certain 
populist way.  
 
The philosophy of Grundtvig became a cor-
nerstone of the movement to create Folk, or 
People's high schools, as well as to enlighten 
the farmers more generally; his views have 
been characterized by a foreign observer as 
"the foundation for a profound cultural synthe-
sis that spoke eloquently to the question of 
nationalism and national identity" (Borish 
1991, p. 17). 
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 In relation to politics, democratic traditions 
have had a long period of formation in Danish 
history, and Denmark was one of the few 
countries in Europe that accomplished a 
peaceful transition to parliamentary democ-
racy. The mobilization of farmers by the Lib-
eral Party in the late nineteenth century cre-
ated a viable opposition to the political domi-
nance of the landowner's Conservative Party. 
The strength of the liberals and, during the 
twentieth century, of the social-democrats 
has led to a distinctive delegation of adminis-
trative tasks to regional and local govern-
ment.  
 
Combined with a wide range of popular asso-
ciations and educational institutions such as 
the People's High Schools, which aimed to 
enhance both the practical skills of young 
people in the countryside and their ability to 
understand and participate in debates over 
major political issues, the Danish tradition for 
decentralized administration has been an im-
portant factor in setting the stage for the con-
solidation of particular kinds of public ac-
countability procedures. 
 
Another key historical factor is the signifi-
cance of what has been called 
“associationalism.” There is a saying that 
“whenever two Danes meet, they form an as-
sociation.” Whilst this is clearly an exaggera-
tion, it is nonetheless true that most Danes do 
take more or less active part in a number of 
associations in the course of their lives. Dan-
ish associations have played important roles 
in creating the various forms of representa-
tion through which individual citizens can or-
ganise themselves and exert political influ-
ence.  
 
Associationalism is a term developed by Lars 
Bo Kaspersen, that denotes the importance 
of associations in the Danish political culture 
but also in a broader sense of being schools 
of democratic learning (Torpe interview). As-
sociationalism is important in helping to un-
derstand the current political landscape and 
the ways in which the associations as schools 
of democratic skills help shape what mightbe  
called a framework of democratic coherence 
between politicians and the public, between 
the “representers” and the “represented” (An-
dersen interview). 
 
The first Danish political associations date 
back to the 18th century, to the period of 
enlightenment. Landhusholdningsselskabet 
(Agricultural Society) sought to improve Dan-
ish agriculture by stimulating the use and de-
velopment of new technologies and the 
spreading of know-how to farmers throughout 
the country (Christensen 1996). These at-
tempts were not just about technology trans-
fer, they were also carried out as a social en-
gineering project with the ambition of creating 
an enlightened social strata that was to en-
hance the country’s economy via scientific 
findings and by applying this knowledge to 
agricultural production. 
 
The second half of the 19th century has been 
labelled the “Age of Associations” by histori-
ans (e.g. Olsen 1990). The period that fol-
lowed the peaceful transition to representa-
tive democracy in 1849 saw, apart from the 
political modernisation, new developments 
within the economic sphere and in the wider 
civic society, especially among the farmers, 
that were prompted by the formation of new 
associations and interest-groups that had di-
rect political power as one of several main 
objectives. 
 
In 1857 the labour market was liberalised; the 
old guild system that controlled most trades in 
the cities was abandoned, and now every-
body was free to compete on the market. 
New trades were emerging and new alliances 
were formed between formerly incompatible 
associations of people from various trades. 
Also, a new group of relatively wealthy farm-
  13 
 ers established corporations that made them 
independent of the major dairies and other 
retailers.  
 
In the towns, on the local level, citizen asso-
ciations played important political roles along 
with the political parties and were repre-
sented in city councils and municipalities. 
These developments that were directed at 
gaining political influence was accompanied 
by the religious national romantic sentiment 
of the time, especially as formulated by 
Grundtvig, whose teachings had a major im-
pact on the farmers’ movement and, in gen-
eral terms, throughout the Danish society.  
 
Later in the 1870s the first attempts to form 
labour unions were made and the develop-
ment of democratic socialism became a sig-
nificant social force in Danish politics when 
the country became increasingly industrial-
ised in the decades before 1900. Revolution-
ary socialism did not gain much support and 
the Danish workers’ unions were much influ-
enced by social democratic ideology (Bryld 
1994).  
 
The social democratic party formed its first 
government in the 1930s and since then the 
party has played a dominant role in the crea-
tion of the Danish welfare state. The 1930s 
generally saw a nationalisation of the political 
life, where national political issues became 
connected to the local level, and the more 
formal ways of representation via political 
parties became the order of the day. 
 
Over time, there has been an increasing pro-
fessionalization of how the activities within an 
association are organised. Also associations 
have been seen to play much more powerful 
roles on the political level, hiring professional 
consultants for managing public relations and 
so on. Already in the 19th century, the asso-
ciations were openly supported by the state 
authorities. The relationship between govern-
ment bodies and the associations in the first 
half of the 20th century was characterised by 
openness and plurality in the sense that  
 
the associations organised and canalised cer-
tain interests and viewpoints to the wider pub-
lic and into the political institutions, who were 
relatively open minded and responsive. The 
associations were the mediating structures 
between the individual citizen and the state, 
which mutually influenced each other. The 
associations helped form the citizens’ percep-
tion of what was to count as ‘proper democ-
ratic behaviour’ and what norms one had to 
comply with as a democratic citizen. But the 
political institutions were also contributing to 
the formation of the citizens’ democratic 
world-view – both directly and indirectly via 
the associations. Thus, it makes no sense to 
speak of civic society/Life world and State/
System as two separate worlds. The political 
institutions are just as important for develop-
ing a democratic culture as free and inde-
pendent associations are (Gundelach and 
Torpe 2001, pp 81-82). 
 
The associations were “schools of democ-
racy” in the sense that as a member of an 
association, one had to learn and comply with 
the rules, i.e. that elections are acceptable 
ways in which the distribution of leader-and 
membership roles are made. The former Min-
ister of Finance, the social democrat Poul 
Hansen, argued that “when you join an asso-
ciation it feels natural to comply with its rules 
and regulations – rights and duties are clear 
and simple – and from the experience of fel-
lowship in the small follows the understanding 
of the political fellowship on the national 
level” (quoted in Gundelach and Torpe 2001, 
p. 80). 
 
However, this model of associations as 
schools of democracy refers mostly to the 
period before the 1980s. Previously associa-
tions could provide a range of various activi-
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 ties, sports, parties, holiday trips along with 
the main activities of the association. Today, 
the citizen may be enrolled in a range of 
separate associations to fulfil these needs, 
and one association seldom satsifies them 
all. 
 
In the 1990s, many associations, and political 
parties, as well, for that matter, have devel-
oped strong and powerful secretariats and 
typically associations have become primarily 
lobbying organizations, run much like busi-
nesses with a professional staff. This devel-
opment may have resulted in more political 
influence, but the distance between ordinary 
members and their representatives has in-
creased while the opportunities for exerting 
one’s influence as an ordinary member have 
diminished (Torpe and Christiansen inter-
views). 
 
In any case, it can be suggested that the 
Danish associationalist culture has pervaded 
the political life, where corporatism based on 
alliances between various associations have 
been influencing the policy process, either as 
lobbyists or because they have been given 
important roles in policy making. 
 
Education has also played an important role 
in various ways in creating what may be 
termed a relatively stable society. The school 
system also contributed to the building up of 
Danish nationalism in various ways. There 
were both formal and informal, more civic so-
ciety based forms of education. For instance 
the public schools and the People’s High 
Schools that served to instil an appreciation 
and the allegiance not only to the Parliamen-
tary system, but also to the King. From the 
18th century, large parts of the adult Danish 
population had a minimum of reading skills, 
because the Protestant church had instituted 
a rule, that in order for a young couple to get 
married, they had to be able to read the Lu-
theran Catechism (Christensen 1996). 
The King established public schools in the 
beginning of the 19th century as a means to 
make a basis for recruitment to the King’s 
Army. The rationale behind this was to disci-
pline the peasants in order to enrol them in 
the Danish army. The first law on public edu-
cation came was instituted in 1808. The pub-
lic education system has also from the very 
beginning been important for educating the 
public in the skills and workings of democ-
racy. The development of Public education 
should be seen as both a process of 
“democratisation” and also of “civilisation”, of 
securing social coherence and also of taming 
unruly elements in the creation of the modern 
state.  
 
The legal system 
 
A number of institutions have been estab-
lished in order to ensure that the citizens can 
control the administrative system - complaints 
boards, courts of justice, the ombudsman, 
rules about the right of access to documents 
etc. - all of which embody public accountabil-
ity procedures through which the individual or 
a group of citizens can control the rulings of 
the administrative system. The citizens have 
the right to access all documents that are pro-
duced within the administrative system. All 
documents are archived in the Public Record 
Office (Rigsarkivet). Attempts have been 
made to convert all archives into electronic 
databases, and this development will most 
likely continue in the coming years. 
 
Although the right to access is instituted by 
law, there are many examples of difficulties 
and bureaucratic bottlenecks that have to be 
overcome if the law is to function optimally. 
Although all documents are filed according to 
a certain code, there are certain limits to what 
information the citizens can get from the vari-
ous authorities.  
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 For instance, an NGO-representative wanted 
to know how many and what sorts of GMOs 
were planted in Denmark and requested right 
of access to documents. The department re-
plied that this could not be granted, because 
the question was too general – he would 
have to name the specific GMOs that he 
wanted to be informed about. When he re-
turned with a list of plants using codes for 
various GMOs the department rejected his 
right of access because the codes were EU 
codes and not based on the Danish code-
system. The NGO-representative eventually 
got permission to access the relevant docu-
ments by complaining to the Ombudsman 
(Toft interview).  
 
There may be several reasons for what many 
citizens have experienced as a reluctance 
towards granting right of access to docu-
ments. The law is hard to administer because 
the data are not always accessible in the form 
the citizen wants and no extra funds are 
given to administer the law, which puts an 
extra burden on the departments when right 
of access is requested. Furthermore, the ex-
pertise within the administration may not al-
ways be sufficient to secure that the right 
documents are accessed (Toft interview). 
 
There are two types of complaint boards to 
which the citizens can direct their complaints 
over the rulings of the administration: the or-
dinary complaint boards that are integrated in 
the administrative system, (i.e. tax complaint 
boards) and the independent complaint 
boards that belong to another administrative 
branch independent of the one that the citizen 
complained about.  
 
The local municipalities enjoy quite a lot of 
independence as local political units, but are 
nevertheless supervised by the county’s su-
pervisory committees. Most recently, a super-
visory committee has been active in the mu-
nicipality of Farum, north of Copenhagen, 
where the Liberal mayor has been accused of 
fraud and of building up a network of private-
public-partnerships that have been using lo-
cal tax money for illegitimate purposes. 
 
In more serious cases, and in case in which 
the citizen does not accept the rulings of the 
complaint boards, the citizen has the possibil-
ity of having the rulings of the administration 
tried at the Courts of Justice. The court can 
pass judgements of whether the rulings of the 
administration are valid or not. The courts will 
not settle the cases, but instead lay out the 
premises for how this should be done.  
 
The Ombudsman 
 
The Ombudsman institution was adopted af-
ter the Swedish model in 1953. The Danish 
Ombudsman is situated between the Parlia-
ment, the administration (municipalities and 
ministries) on the one hand and the individual 
citizen on the other. The Ombudsman has no 
real executive powers. His duty is to ensure 
that the administrative system is functioning 
in a satisfactory manner. 
  
After each Parliamentary election the new 
Parliament elects a new Ombudsman, that on 
behalf of the Parliament monitors whether the 
Danish authorities act in accordance with the 
law or if they in other ways make mistakes or 
neglect their duties. The Ombudsman has to 
deliver an annual report to the Parliament or 
when dealing with cases, that he considers 
being of special importance.  
 
The Ombudsman works independently of the 
Parliament and he decides whether com-
plaints should be investigated. He cannot be 
a Member of Parliament or municipal council. 
He employs and dismisses his staff and can 
demand that he himself be dismissed with six 
months notice.  
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 Although the law describes the Ombudsman 
as the Parliament’s Ombudsman, it is more 
precise to speak of the citizens’ Ombudsman. 
For the citizens, the safeguard of the Om-
budsman’s-institution consists of the relatively 
free access to making complaints. Com-
plaints to the Ombudsman is free of charge 
and only a few conditions have to be met. 
The rulings of the Ombudsman are final, and 
the complaint that must not be given anony-
mously must be lodged within one year. 
 
The Ombudsman decides on his own 
whether he will initiate an investigation into 
the matter or not, and what aspects he will 
investigate. He is not confined to investigate 
what the complainant should wish the Om-
budsman to do. The starting point is that the 
Ombudsman investigates the case if not the 
complaint is groundless or of little importance.  
 
At this stage the Ombudsman evaluates the 
complaint and the prospect of him being able 
to help the complainant. If there seems to be 
no prospects of complaining, and there are 
no further evidence that the rulings of the au-
thorities are wrong, the Ombudsman does not 
have to ask the authorities for a declaration. 
He can then write directly to the complainant 
and explain why he does not take on the 
case.  
 
The Ombudsman also initiates inspections of 
any of the State’s institutions. These inspec-
tions take place foremost where citizens are 
deprived of their liberty, i.e. prisons, deten-
tions, psychiatric hospitals etc. An inspection 
may contain an examination of the physical 
conditions at the institution in question, but 
also interviews of the inmates and staff. Fur-
thermore, the Ombudsman and his employ-
ees examine relevant documents to deter-
mine whether the rules that apply to the inter-
ventions of staff in the inmates privacy has 
been observed. 
 
In 1999 the Ombudsman dealt with 949 com-
plaints. In 118 of these he upheld the claim-
ants' contention and found that there were 
grounds for criticising the rulings of the ad-
ministration. In 60 cases he asked the au-
thorities to reconsider their rulings. Generally, 
these recommendations are followed without 
exceptions. If the authorities maintain their 
rulings, the Ombudsman has the possibility of 
asking the Directorate of Civil Rights to grant 
the claimant civil aid at the courts. 
 
As mentioned above, the Ombudsman has 
no powers to pass judgements so his author-
ity lies in his capacity to be independent and 
make qualified examinations of the cases he 
enters. In this respect his authority is compa-
rable to the media's that also examines simi-
lar cases of complaints but have no powers to 
pass judgements.  
 
The authority of the Ombudsman relies on a 
delicate balance: if the rulings of the Om-
budsman are very controversial, he may risk 
a  loss of credibility, on the other hand, most 
of the cases that the Ombudsman takes on 
are controversial in the sense that they ques-
tion the rulings of other authority bodies. If the 
Ombudsman refuses to take them on, his ar-
guments for doing so must be well founded, 
for not risking that the trust in him is lost 
(Søndergaard interview). 
 
The political system 
 
The Danish parliamentary system is classical 
in the sense that the sovereignty is based on 
the will of the people. The parliament 
(Folketing) has 179 seats and comprises, af-
ter the last election of November 2001, eight 
political parties.  
 
The major debates take place in the Chamber 
and the formal decisions are made here. But 
the decisions are prepared in the committees 
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 of the Folketing. The Committees have thus 
been labelled the “workshops of the Folket-
ing.” (www.folketinget.dk). The work of the 
committees is primarily linked to the reading 
of Bills and proposals for parliamentary reso-
lution.  
 
The Folketing has 24 standing committees. 
Each of the committees is composed of 17 
Members. The working sphere of a commit-
tee largely corresponds to that of a Ministry. 
The Ministry of Social Affairs for instance cor-
responds to a Social Affairs Committee, the 
Ministry of Taxation to a Fiscal Affairs Com-
mittee and so on. The main task of the Fi-
nance Committee is to read finance Bills and 
supplementary appropriation Bills as well as 
to take a stand on the appropriations required 
over the year.  
 
Before presenting a bill to the Parliament, the 
ministry that produces the bill usually consults 
several interest groups (NGOs, for example), 
government institutions and other actors to 
hear their reaction to the preliminary bill pro-
posal. When the ministry has received the 
responses to the bill proposal, amendments 
are incorporated before the bill is presented 
to the Parliament.  
 
After the bill has been presented to the Par-
liament, it is usually passed on to a Parlia-
ment committee, for further elaboration. In the 
case of animal welfare issues, the bill is 
passed on to the Parliament’s Juridical Com-
mittee. When working on the bill, the commit-
tee is free to ask questions to the relevant 
ministries, hold meetings with ministers, ar-
range hearings, visit relevant institutions, etc. 
 
Before the bill can be subject to the second 
round of parliamentary debate, the committee 
must produce a report of its work on the bill. 
The committee decides when the report will 
be published. In practice, the report is nor-
mally presented after time has been allotted 
to questioning and debate, meetings and po-
litical negotiations about the bill. After the 2nd 
round of parliamentary debate, the bill is sub-
ject to the 3rd round, followed by a parliamen-
tary vote, by which the bill is normally passed. 
 
Before the former social democratic led gov-
ernment period, the committees played a 
more dominant role in preparing the law pro-
posals. However, the workload of this part of 
the legislative process became too over-
whelming for the various committees to do, 
so instead, most often the ministries are the 
originators of the law proposals. This has of 
course made the process less transparent but 
more efficient. 
 
In the first months after the election, the lib-
eral government has managed to do away 
with the various committees in the sense that 
bills have been presented to the parliament 
without having gone through the usual proce-
dure in the committees. Because the govern-
ment presides over the majority of votes in 
the Parliament, it is able to avoid the influ-
ence of the committees.  
 
The European Affairs Committee deals with 
questions related to the EU; it is this Commit-
tee that gives the Ministers their mandates for 
negotiation. The committee is in this way 
more autonomous than the other committees. 
Nine out of ten times, the committee will 
sanction the Minister’s proposal for negotia-
tion, after which the Minister goes to Brussels 
to negotiate.  
 
The EU-Committee can place responsibility 
on the minister on its own, if the minister has 
not lived up to the expectations of the EU-
committee. This happened in the 1980s, 
where the Minister of Agriculture received a 
“nose” (a reprimand), dished out to him by the 
EU-committee without the involvement of the 
Parliament. The “nose” is a form of sanction 
that is used in cases of less gravity than if for 
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 instance the Parliament gives a minister a 
vote of no confidence, in which case the min-
ister must step back. 
 
The media 
 
As in most modern democracies, the role of 
the media in providing fora for political discus-
sions and for presenting political issues to the 
general public has increased dramatically in 
recent years (Hjarvard 2001). Furthermore, 
there seems to be a consensus among media 
scientists that the role of the media is that of 
an independent actor, not just a mediator be-
tween the political level and the citizens, al-
though the exact role of the media is very 
hard to define, because of the diversity the 
media have in modern society. The freedom 
of press that was introduced a few years be-
fore the democratic constitution in 1849 gave 
rise to a plethora of newspapers and bulle-
tins, both on the local and the national level.  
 
It was common that every major provincial 
town had four newspapers directed at four 
different ”publics”. In the 20th century this 
structure has been maintained, even though 
there has been a centralization of the print 
media, and most towns have lost many of 
their separate papers. A range of different 
newspapers are written for each audience, or 
public. Although the direct relation between 
political parties and newspapers have weak-
ened, some newspapers have been seen to 
openly support the election campaigns of cer-
tain political parties. 
 
Along with the development of the electronic 
media the roles of journalists have undergone 
a number of changes in terms of how news 
was covered. Generally speaking, before the 
second world war journalists were seen to be 
less critical in their way of  conveying infor-
mation from experts and authorities - the jour-
nalists primarily saw themselves as media-
tors; reporting and editorial writing were two 
separate activities (Lund 1997). After the sec-
ond world war, the press became increasingly 
critical and were seen to be much more scep-
tical towards authorities and the journalists 
developed a much more self-conscious ap-
proach to putting issues on the agenda, in-
vestigating cases etc. 
 
With the establishment of the state monopo-
lised Radio Broadcasting Corporation 
(Danmarks Radio in 1925) and the advent of 
television in 1951 also monopolised by the 
state, an era of a relatively stable and coher-
ent public media unfolded itself. There was 
much concern that the electronic media were 
very powerful and there were fears that televi-
sion and radio could be used for ”indoctri-
nating” the public.  
 
In order to ensure that radio- and television 
programmes were politically balanced, the 
Board of the Danish Radio Broadcasting Cor-
poration was established in 1953 (but has 
recently been disbanded). The members of 
the Board were selected from the political 
parties in proportion to their representation in 
the parliament. Because of the dominance of 
the Radio Denmark monopoly the public 
sphere from the 1950s until 1988 has been 
characterised as very coherent, given the fact 
that most Danes had TV-sets and all watched 
the same programmes. 
 
In 1988 the commercial channel TV2 was es-
tablished, and now Danes were challenged 
by having to choose between two channels. 
The new TV2 channel was also paid for by 
the public service licences and took over the 
task of establishing local TV-stations, that 
broadcasts news reports each night from the 
various regions in Denmark.  
 
In the 1990’s cable television services be-
came popular and now Danes have access to 
a plethora of TV-channels, national, interna-
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 tional and local. At the same time, commer-
cial channels have been created both on tele-
vision and radio. For the most part, however, 
the evening news are still dominated by the 
news reports from Denmark 1 and TV2 and 
these reports tend to be almost identical in 
terms of selection of news stories and the 
style of reporting. 
 
Due to the competition among the various 
TV-channels, the journalists have taken on a 
whole new set of roles in the public sphere, 
comparable to the dramatist of a theatre. 
(Lund, 1997; Danielsen interview). It is very 
common that journalists invite persons, that 
is, experts or representatives from political 
parties and interest organisations that repre-
sent opposing views on an issue to a live de-
bate in the television studio. Although there 
may seem to be some considerations about 
democratic representation in these debates, 
there is little room left for creating a conversa-
tion in the Habermasian sense that is. aimed 
at reaching a common “higher reason.” (This 
use of experts in news programmes has been 
experienced by several of the interviewees 
Krawack, Jesper Toft, Danielsen, Henrik 
Toft). By this “staging of democracy” the pub-
lic is reduced to the role of spectators who 
experience the quarrels or the drama be-
tween representatives with opposing views as 
in a sports match and there is, as such, little 
opportunity to hear other, more differentiated 
views on the issue in question.  
 
The private sector 
 
There is a tradition and wide range of primar-
ily informal procedures for consulting repre-
sentatives from private companies and from 
industrial associations in the preparatory 
phases of policy-making and planning. These 
consultations can take the form of public 
hearings, but most often they are meetings 
behind so-called closed doors.  
In terms of bargaining between the labour 
unions and the employers organisations 
about wages and other conditions on the la-
bour market there has been established a 
procedure of three part negotiations with the 
so-called forligsmand playing the role of me-
diator. The forligsmand is supposed to inde-
pendent of the interests of the other two parts 
but has the mandate to further the negotia-
tions and push the involved actors to reach 
compromises. In this respect there is a tradi-
tion on behalf of the state for letting the actors 
to negotiate themselves instead of imposing 
regulations.  
 
The system of contracting out task that previ-
ously were taken on by the state has been 
employed since the 18th century and does 
not represent a historic ‘new’ invention as of-
ten argued by adherents of New Public Man-
agement Reform. Contracting out has since 
the 1980s been promoted actively by all of 
the different Danish governments. There has 
been much controversy and public debate 
about whether outsourcing leads to a deterio-
ration in the quality of service being provided. 
Some outsourcing schemes have been aban-
doned, most recently in a Danish municipal-
ity, where a private company had taken over 
care of the elderly, but failed to deliver a rea-
sonable and cost-effective service. 
 
The involvement of IT-companies in creating 
large government IT-systems has been seen 
to give rise to a lot of problems or 
“government IT-scandals.” Some problems 
have been caused by private companies that, 
in order to gain a contract, have been prone 
to underestimate the real costs of the project 
and the real price for providing the service.  
 
Since the employment of another subcontrac-
tor would mean even more costs, the original 
private subcontractors have been retained as 
responsible for carrying out the project. In the 
case of one government IT-scandal the audi-
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 tor of public accounts was enrolled to investi-
gate what financial dispositions had been 
taken during the course of the project. 
 
A number of supervisory committees have 
been established to examine public private 
partnerships (or PPPs) in order to ensure that 
the rules are followed in the area.  Notewor-
thy are the “County Supervisory Commit-
tees” (Tilsynsråd) which, in have been given 
the task of examining and monitoring PPPs, 
as part of their overall task of overseeing mu-
nicipal government. A major scandal is cur-
rently being enacted in Farum, where a liberal 
mayor used questionable methods of mixing 
private and public funds for a number of 
highly publicized programs of local govern-
ment. In particular, he sold many of the mu-
nicipal services to private companies, in 
which he was a partner. It has been argued 
that contracting out always results in limited 
means of democratic control, because in 
transferring public services to private compa-
nies, the “political becomes private” – in other 
words, private companies carry out policies 
that are less open for scrutinizing and less 
open for democratic control by the public. 
 
A deliberate attempt to diminish public access 
to a large government project has been made 
in relation to the newly projected Copenha-
gen Metro System. Representatives from the 
City Council of Copenhagen and their private 
counterparts have set up a company 
(Ørestadsselskabet A/S) that are in charge of 
building and outsourcing the operation of the 
Metro System. By doing so, it has been pos-
sible for the company to keep their project 
dispositions and accounts secret to the pub-
lic. 
  
Other attempts have been made for making 
companies take on a social responsibility. Es-
pecially during the former Social Democrat 
government systems of green accounting 
were promoted in order to make private en-
terprises more socially accountable. For in-
stance, a lot of effort was put into creating so 
called light jobs in the private sector for peo-
ple who otherwise would have had difficulties 
finding work. 
 
Green public accountability procedures have 
been a kind of experimental activity, but the 
effects of these procedures has been rather 
limited, in so far as only a minority of compa-
nies have adopted these systems of account-
ing. The green accountability procedures 
have worked well in the relatively few compa-
nies that have adopted these measures and 
incorporated them in their marketing strate-
gies to help convey an image of social re-
sponsibility. But many companies, particularly 
in the agricultural and food-processing indus-
tries, were opposed to these procedures, par-
ticularly when they challenged normal busi-
ness practices. 
 
Some private companies have been active in 
initiating dialogues and fostering “stakeholder 
involvement” in relation to controversial tech-
nologies. For instance, the biomedical firm 
Novo Nordisk, in its development of geneti-
cally modified organisms for pharmaceutical 
products, performs animal experiments that 
have been criticised by animal protection 
groups. In recent years, the company has 
been engaged in a number of activities with 
critics, including regular discussions with rep-
resentatives from the non-governmental or-
ganizations, and inspection of  laboratories by 
outsiders. 
 
The making of a  
consensual regime  
 
In the course of the 20th century, consensus-
making and compromise tended to become 
central features of political life in Denmark, for 
both external and internal reasons. As a small 
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 country that was occupied by Germany in the 
second world war, there was a widely-felt 
need after the war for a broad based govern-
ment and a broad consensus and national 
agreement, particularly in matters of foreign 
affairs and international relations. Because of 
the dualistic nature of the country, however, 
there was an underlying tension that has 
been brought out into the open on several 
occasions during the past 30 years - espe-
cially in relation to the European Union 
(where opposition remains strong in Den-
mark) and, most recently, immigration. 
 
There were also more pragmatic, internal rea-
sons behind the making of what might be 
termed a consensual regime of public ac-
countability procedures. Since no particular 
group in the society could rule without sup-
port from other groups, there was a need to 
compromise, to reach a consensus or at least 
a representative majority about most social 
issues. There were also strong traditions of 
interaction, as we have seen, between what 
in other countries are the more separate 
spheres of state and civil society.  As in the 
other Nordic countries, corporatism had been 
a key feature in the creation of a welfare 
state, and in the development of policies, for 
example, in relation to environmental protec-
tion and technological development (see 
Christiansen, ed 1996). 
 
When public debates about environmental 
and energy issues started to intensify in the 
1970s, particularly around nuclear energy but 
also around the use of chemicals in agricul-
ture and industry, they took on a special char-
acter, and struck especially deep chords in 
the political culture. They were unusually 
wide-ranging, but also, from the beginning, 
unusually constructive. Almost at the same 
time that a movement emerged against nu-
clear energy, grass-roots groups and people's 
high schools were experimenting with wind 
energy and other renewables, and wind 
power has since grown into an important ex-
port industry (Jørgensen and Karnøe 1995). 
Similarly, ecological agriculture was practiced 
early and actively, compared to other coun-
tries, and the "ecological farmers" today are 
an important actor network in the debates 
about biotechnology and food production 
more generally.  
 
Another important element in the making of a 
consensual accountability is what might be 
termed the quality of the public sphere. The 
conditions of Danish public life in the 1970s 
were congenial, we might say, to getting a 
good debate going. The breadth of the 
counter culture and the "new left" were im-
pressive - from communes to Christiania, 
from academic marxism and leftist parties to 
active feminist and environmental movements 
(the fact that the Socialist People's Party had 
been created in the 1950s and become a sig-
nificant parliamentary force is also important).  
 
There were also the new universities of 
Roskilde and Aalborg, founded in 1972 and 
1974, respectively, which prided themselves 
on their innovative radical approaches to edu-
cation. Roskilde University Center, in particu-
lar, has continued into the 1990s to be a base 
for both radical, leftist politics and for peda-
gogical innovation (almost all undergraduate 
education takes the form of group project 
work, and most of it is interdisciplinary, as 
well). There was also in the 1970s a lively 
alternative media, with the daily newspaper 
Information (created in the Resistance move-
ment of the second world war) and the 
weekly Politisk Revy, covering all sides of the 
"new social movements", both the cultural 
and political. Information was especially im-
portant in covering the nuclear energy de-
bate, as it unfolded in the 1970s, which had 
an extra advantage in comparison with sev-
eral other European countries due to the fact 
that Denmark had not yet established nuclear 
energy: there was thus something to debate 
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 and a lot more need and opportunity for con-
structive alternative thinking, including ideas 
about new public accountability procedures. 
 
The environmental and energy debates were 
quite diverse and multifaceted both in sub-
stance and form, and they were widely cov-
ered in the more established media - both 
radio, television  and newspapers, as well as 
the alternative press. There also emerged a 
special “radical science” journal in Denmark, 
Naturkampen (Nature Struggle), which, in 
comparison to radical science journals in 
other countries, was unusually professional 
and influential. It covered the many activities 
of leftward leaning scientists and engineers in 
Aalborg and Roskilde, often in relation to la-
bor groups around occupational health is-
sues. Like radical science journals in other 
countries, it covered the issues of sociobiol-
ogy, nuclear energy, militarism and labor de-
skilling; but most importantly perhaps, it pro-
vided a vehicle for the kind of radical popular 
science writing that would continue in book 
form in the years to come. Shaped by what 
might be termed a particular Danish 
“discursive framework”, combining cultural 
modernism with a rural-based populism, 
Naturkampen could play a role in the public 
sphere that its radical science counterparts in 
other countries never managed to achieve. 
 
The environmental “movement” that devel-
oped in Denmark in the 1970s was also a 
more significant public presence than it was 
in many other countries It was, for one thing, 
much more characterized by local experi-
ments, and a booming wind energy industry 
is one of the most visible results (Jamison et 
al 1990: 66ff). In Denmark, environmental is-
sues became more directly associated with 
the alternative political ideologies that grew 
out of the youth rebellion and the student 
movement of the late 1960s. The most impor-
tant organization in this connection was 
NOAH, started in 1969 by biology and archi-
tecture students in Copenhagen, which soon 
developed into a national organization of en-
vironmental activism. NOAH utilized scientific 
information and cooperated with scientists 
who served as “counter-experts” particularly 
in relation to the media. In this way, the first 
efforts at creating public awareness of envi-
ronmental problems in Denmark were carried 
out by an alliance between students and the 
media. 
 
The activist approach of NOAH drew on the 
Danish tradition of participatory democracy 
associated with the People's High Schools, 
and, more generally, on the populist political 
tradition of the 19th century. The new social 
movements like NOAH that emerged in the 
1970s contributed to a new kind of public 
sphere that could, for a brief time, combine 
rural populism with urban cosmopolitanism. In 
contrast to other countries, the "grass roots" 
dimension remained important, even as envi-
ronmentalists tried to influence energy policy 
and develop alternative means of energy sup-
ply. The opposition to nuclear energy was 
coordinated by an independent Organization 
for Information about Nuclear Power (OOA), 
which so effectively mobilized public resis-
tance and pressure that the Danish govern-
ment abandoned its nuclear plans in the late 
1970s. In addition, the popular debate on al-
ternative energy sources and various public 
awareness and information campaigns, en-
couraged movement organizations to foster 
local practical initiatives which gradually be-
came an accepted part of environmental pol-
icy in Denmark. 
 
In a variety of ways, the contextual conditions 
were substantially changed in the course of 
the 1980s, as the broad-based and voluntary 
movements that had been so important in the 
1970s became ever more differentiated and 
professionalized (Jamison 2001). For one 
thing, in relation to nuclear energy, the move-
ments had succeeded in their political task, 
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 and there was a need to branch out and ex-
pand the interest in “technology assessment” 
to other areas. As is so often the case with 
influential social movements, there was a 
kind of institutionalization process that set in, 
as some activists set up consulting firms and 
wind-energy companies, others established 
themselves in the state bureaucracy or as 
academic experts, and still others moved into 
party politics. These developments can be 
seen to have weakened the populist aspects 
of the environmental movement. For another, 
the political situation changed in the early 
1980s, as the winds of neo-liberalism started 
to blow across Scandinavia, and the conser-
vative-led coalition government, which came 
into office in 1982, tried to balance the enthu-
siasms of the 1970s with the new ideological 
climate of the 1980s. The interest in the envi-
ronment, however, and support for renewable 
energy seemed to cross ideological lines, and 
throughout the 1980s, there was a so-called 
“green majority” in the parliament that took a 
number of initiatives to establish what we 
might call a consensual regime of public ac-
countability. 
 
There were thus several distinct steps in the 
making of the regime. The first step was the 
creation of a small unit for technology assess-
ment within the state technology support 
agency, then called the Technology Council. 
In the wake of the energy debate of the 
1970s, which had been conducted, not just 
within the environmental movement, but also 
under the auspices of a state-supported En-
ergy Information Campaign, a parliamentary 
commission was given the task of proposing 
a form for accountability for large technologi-
cal projects: what has since come to be 
called “technology assessment”. The unit at 
the Technology Council was one result, as 
was the creation of a Technology and Society 
program initiative at the Social Science Re-
search Council. Support from both units was 
instrumental in the emergence of science and 
technology studies at Danish universities, 
particularly at the Danish Technical Univer-
sity, but also at the new universities in 
Roskilde and Aalborg (Munch 1995). 
 
A further step in the institutionalization proc-
ess was the establishment in 1986 of the 
Board for Technology, which was created by 
the parliament to provide a focal point for 
technology assessment activity (Jamison and 
Baark 1990). The Board sponsored public 
hearings, which came to be known as con-
sensus conferences, such ass, and published 
a magazine and a number of popular reports, 
while participating in a number of projects 
and "social experiments" particularly in rela-
tion to the social diffusion of information tech-
nology. 
 
Much of the activity that the Board was in-
volved in was integrally connected to the 
large technology development programs initi-
ated by the Danish government in the second 
half of the 1980s, and which formed the cor-
nerstones of a new active period of state in-
novation policy. Both in relation to the Infor-
mation Technology Program, the Biotechnol-
ogy Program, and the Cleaner Technology 
program, substantial funding was made avail-
able for technology assessment and informa-
tion activities, which supplemented the sup-
port given to "technology and society" re-
search by the Social Science Research 
Council.  
 
The result of these activities was thus both a 
number of new experts in "science, technol-
ogy and society," as well as new opportunity 
structures for the radical debaters of the 
1970s. But it is also important to see these 
developments as part of a "strategic" shift in 
science and technology policy, which also 
included, in Denmark, increased funding for 
sectorial research institutes outside of the 
universities. 
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 Another important factor in the contextual 
changes of the 1980s was the expansion of 
the European Community, which would con-
tinue into the 1990s. For one thing, much of 
the substance of the debate moved to a lar-
ger, more transnational realm, where it was 
harder for local and amateurish "grass roots" 
voices to be heard; and for another many of 
the new experts found themselves involved in 
European projects, networks and other activi-
ties.  
 
For example, one of the founding members of 
Naturkampen, Per Sørup, got a job in Brus-
sels in the 1980s where he was instrumental 
in establishing the social science research 
research initiatives in the Environment and 
Climate program, and later helped create the 
Institute for Prospective Technology Studies 
in Seville, where he is now based. 
 
Finally, and perhaps of most importance to 
the changing nature of public accountability 
procedures in Denmark, was the normaliza-
tion of the issues that had given rise to such 
intensive debate in the 1970s and the emer-
gence of a new kind of professional environ-
mental movement. All the key problem areas 
- from nuclear energy to industrial pollution, 
from occupational health and safety to traffic 
congestion and urban sprawl - were largely 
taken over by newly established official bod-
ies, engineering consulting firms, sectorial 
research institutes, and transnational non-
governmental organizations.  
 
There came into being in Denmark, as was 
the case in most other European countries, a 
cluster of government agencies and depart-
ments for the environment, transportation, 
energy and planning, and new cadres of en-
ergy and environmental experts. As else-
where, the 1980s were a period when the 
new social movements were largely trans-
formed into a range of new professional ac-
tivities. 
The greening of  
accountability 
 
By the early 1990s, the consensual regime 
had become consolidated, and when a social-
democratic government was elected to office 
in 1992, it more or less continued in the same 
ways as its predecessor in stressing social 
and environmental accountability procedures. 
Eventually, however, the consensus that had 
been achieved in the 1980s started to break 
apart.  
 
For one thing, the new social-democratic min-
ister of the environment, Svend Auken, who 
had lost a fight for the party leadership, was 
particularly ambitious in his efforts to “green” 
the Danish society, which obviously meant 
that other policy areas were given somewhat 
lower priority. Auken tried to stake out a lead-
ing role for Denmark, both in relation to Euro-
pean Union environmental policies (the envi-
ronmental agency was located in Copenha-
gen at his urging, while Ritt Bjerregaard, an-
other leading social-democratic politician, and 
former minister, was EU environmental com-
missioner). In any case, Denmark was to be 
one of the more active countries in seeking to 
infuse cleaner production processes and en-
vironmental management systems into indus-
try in the course of the 1990s, and a number 
of green taxes were instituted - a kind of 
greening of accountability (Andersen 1994). 
 
For another, there emerged a kind of back-
lash or resistance to further environmental 
measures on the part of many of the impor-
tant agro-industrial corporations, and, even 
more seriously, within the rural population 
that, as in other parts of Europe, came to be 
affected by an influential populist reaction. 
Other issues, like immigration and declining 
health care, gradually became more impor-
tant in the political debate than environmental 
protection and renewable energy develop-
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 ment, especially when the program of green-
ing or sustainable development was so 
closely identified with the social-democratic 
party and its minister of the environment. 
These anti-environmental sentiments were 
given a highly visible public face in 1997, 
when the statistician Bjørn Lomborg pub-
lished a series of articles in the newspaper 
Politiken, in which he claimed to disclose the 
“real state of the world” in direct opposition to 
what environmental organizations and their 
friends in the Danish government were claim-
ing to be the case. 
 
In Denmark there was a much more deep-
seated realization that "end-of-pipe" solutions 
to environmental problems were not suffi-
cient, and that new approaches stressing a 
change in productive technology were called 
for. Given the perceived limitations of supply 
of energy sources - further reinforced by the 
decision to abandon nuclear power as a re-
sult of the intense public debate of the 1970s 
- the Danish government emphasized the 
transition to renewable energy sources. This 
led, on the one hand, to the establishment 
and rapid growth of the Danish wind turbine 
industry and, on the other hand, to a diversi-
fied regulatory framework in the energy sec-
tor encouraging energy-efficient technologies. 
The attention gradually shifted towards identi-
fication of solutions that could be integrated 
earlier on in the cycles of production and con-
sumption.  
 
The relative effectiveness of economic incen-
tives in improving the technological and or-
ganizational capacity for saving energy has 
inspired similar initiatives in the environ-
mental field: a move from end-of-pipe solu-
tions to a model that emphasizes preventive 
solutions including the development and diffu-
sion of cleaner technology. Beginning in 
1986, the Danish government has launched a 
series of major support programs in cleaner 
technology. Compared to most other Euro-
pean countries, the Danish efforts have been 
substantial, and have spread the various pre-
ventive technical approaches to environ-
mental problems throughout the Danish in-
dustry (Remmen 2001). 
 
In the first phase, from 1986-1989, the effort 
was concentrated primarily on investigating 
the potential for cleaner technologies in differ-
ent branches of the economy, and in conduct-
ing demonstration projects in particular firms. 
The general approach followed similar 
“national programs” in technology develop-
ment that had taken place in the 1980s, in 
relation to information technology and bio-
technology, and were based on the long-
standing Danish emphasis in technology pol-
icy on demonstration projects.  
 
The second phase of the cleaner technology 
program, from 1990-92, involved a more ac-
tive broadening of focus, as well as increased 
competence-building and information dis-
semination. Courses were held at engineer-
ing colleges and associations, handbooks 
were written, and special branch consulting 
schemes in cleaner technology were estab-
lished in four particular branches: furniture-
making, meat processing, fish production, 
and metal-working.  
 
At the same time, environmental manage-
ment systems were instituted in a number of 
small and medium-sized companies with gov-
ernmental support, and major efforts were 
taken to document the experiences with 
cleaner technology, through a number of 
technology assessment projects at the tech-
nological universities. From 1993, the efforts 
have expanded further, as the environmental 
administration has adopted a more flexible, 
interactive approach, seeking to pass respon-
sibility and policy initiative from the public to 
the private sector. 
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 The new attempts to alleviate the problems of 
environmental degradation were, to a signifi-
cant extent, based on a dialogue between 
public and private interests that has charac-
terized Danish approaches from the begin-
ning, and a new ideology of commercializa-
tion and the use of market forces in regula-
tion. In the political atmosphere that prevailed 
in Denmark during the 1980s, when the gov-
ernment was usually based on a combination 
of parties from the center to the right of the 
political spectrum under the leadership of the 
Conservative Party, there was a strong lean-
ing towards liberal economic policies and in-
direct instruments of regulation, i.e., small 
government.  
 
Even in areas where the government was un-
able to secure a majority of votes in the Par-
liament for its policies - as the case was for 
much of the environmental legislation which 
was dominated by the so-called "green major-
ity" (social liberals, social democrats and two 
left-wing parties) - the subsequent implemen-
tation of policies tended to be framed in the 
manner of indirect regulation. 
 
This shift in awareness and attention to a 
wider economic perspective was also rein-
forced by the initiatives which sought to inte-
grate technology assessment more directly 
into policy making procedures. In many ways, 
a particular Danish style of technology as-
sessment found its application in the policy 
debates related to areas such as biotechnol-
ogy and cleaner technology (Jamison and 
Baark 1990). 
 
In the 1990s, Denmark became one of the 
most active countries in Europe in pursuing 
the new ideas of pollution prevention and 
cleaner production. Indeed, the environ-
mental minister Svend Auken proposed, on a 
number of occasions, that Denmark should 
seek to provide an exemplary model for other 
countries to follow. As in the 19th century, 
when traditions of popular participation were 
mobilized in the industrialization process and 
during the second world war, when resistance 
to the Nazis also drew on national cultural 
traditions, Auken argued that the strength of 
Danish democratic institutions and not least 
grass-roots movements is an important factor 
in explaining the relative success of Danish 
environmental policy. 
 
Conclusions 
 
In pursuing the recent shift in public account-
ability regime, the new liberal prime minister 
Anders Fogh Rasmussen and most espe-
cially his minister for the environment have 
been highly influenced by the teachings of 
Bjørn Lomborg, who sprung onto the interna-
tional stage in the summer of 2001 to great 
fanfare when his book, The Sceptical Envi-
ronmentalist, was published in English. Lom-
borg’s role is important in understanding the 
shift in accountability regime in Denmark, and 
it is also brings out the ways in which the two 
political cultures in Denmark have become 
much more antagonistic than they were in the 
1980s. 
 
As already mentioned, Lomborg wrote four 
articles in 1997 in one of the main Danish 
daily newspapers, in which he challenged the 
“litany” of environmental bad news with a sta-
tistical tale of things getting better. Lomborg's 
method of analysis was to reduce everything 
to money, in a kind of cost-benefit analysis 
run wild. His book, published in Danish in 
1998, was called the “Real State of the 
World,” and was filled with many more figures 
than he had managed in his articles. It is im-
portant to realize that cost-benefit analysis for 
Lomborg is a kind of religion rather than what 
most of us think of as science; if you believe 
that the environmental situation is improving, 
then you find the figures to support that belief.  
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 And now the Danish government, eager to 
correct the mistakes of the previous govern-
ment and its experts, appears to be acting on 
that belief. A new institute of economic envi-
ronmental assessment has been proposed, 
while a large number of the previous govern-
ment’s environmental research programs are 
being cut. For Fogh Rasmussen and his min-
isters, environmental protection costs too 
much money, and other priorities are simply 
more important. The pioneering role that Den-
mark has played in relation to international 
environmental negotiations, wind energy de-
velopment, urban ecological experimentation, 
and so many other areas, is fast becoming a 
thing of the past. 
 
The new procedures that have started to be 
put in place differ from the old in at least three 
main ways. On the one hand, because the 
parliamentary map was so fundamentally re-
drawn by the election results, the new gov-
ernment could behave in an explicitly partisan 
manner. Certain publics simply no longer 
needed to be taken into account. The new 
government quickly made it clear that the 
broad-based form of parliamentary decision-
making that had been the standard through 
most of the past 50 years would be replaced 
by a much more ideological approach.  
 
On the other hand, the new government’s 
substantive priorities are different from those 
of the previous government. Shortly after the 
election victory, the new government set to 
work seeking to undo much of the program of 
the previous government.  It had been known 
that the government would cut drastically in 
the foreign aid budget, as well as in the vari-
ous programs that made life easier for immi-
grants to Denmark.  
 
But what had not been known was that the 
new government was so strongly anti- and 
development - the so-called green jobs fund, 
for example - that had been supported by the 
previous government’s ministry of the envi-
ronment, and which have generally received 
positive environmentalist as it soon showed 
itself to be.  
 
The government has decided to cancel sev-
eral large wind-energy projects and close 
down a number of innovative programs in en-
vironmental research evaluations, as well as 
a good deal of international interest. By the 
time the new minister of finance, Thor Peder-
sen, presented the government’s budget at 
the end of January 2002, the drastic nature of 
the transformation was starting to become 
clear. Pedersen eliminated all of the “green 
taxes” that had bothered much of the liberal 
party’s electoral constituency, and soon 
thereafter the environmental ministry an-
nounced drastic cuts. This government 
clearly had a very different underlying con-
cern with the environment than the previous 
government had had. 
 
Finally, the government’s overall conception 
of public accountability differs from that of the 
previous government. The general idea in the 
new accountability regime is that there is only 
so much money to go around - there are to 
be no new taxes - and if health care and the 
elderly need more resources, then the fund-
ing for foreign aid and environmental protec-
tion, for example, must be reduced signifi-
cantly. The main focus of accountability has 
been changed - from social and environ-
mental performance to fiscal, or financial per-
formance.  Accountability is to be represented 
in financial terms: real monetary accounting 
rather than some kind of “green” or social ac-
counting.  
 
It remains an open question how radical this 
shift in regime will turn out to be, but the re-
cent changes do indicate that a discussion of 
public accountability procedures in Denmark 
must take account of the broader political 
context. 
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By Jesper Lassen 
 
 
Summary 
 
The case study deals with the policy debates 
and issues of public accountability associated 
with research, development and production of 
genetically modified (GM) foods in Denmark.  
 
The study seeks to place these debates and 
issues in a broad historical and cultural per-
spective, by tracing shifts in both the form 
and content of public accountability proce-
dures from the emergence of genetic engi-
neering in the 1970s to the present.  
 
Debates in four main contexts are briefly de-
scribed and analyzed, with particular focus on 
issues of public accountability: the public pol-
icy arena, the business community, and in 
particular the firm Novozymes, the academic 
research community and finally the civil soci-
ety, or non-governmental sector. 
 
In Denmark, the debates about genetic engi-
neering have been comparatively intense as 
more members of the public and their repre-
sentatives have gotten involved, or attempted 
to get involved in the processes relating to 
the development, production and, more re-
cently consumption of GM foods. In general 
terms there has also been a broadening of 
the debate from an initial concern with scien-
tific issues and the safety of laboratory ex-
periments to a much wider range of issues - 
from environmental risks to political economy 
to ethics and morality. 
 
Introductory background 
 
The assessment of gene technology and, 
with it, GM foods, can be seen to have gone 
through several phases since the 1970s, 
roughly corresponding to the different stages 
of technological development (Jelsøe, Du-
rant, 1998, Lassen, 1999). In each phase, 
there have been somewhat different issues 
and actors involved in the policy debate and, 
as a result, there have thus been some rather 
significant changes in the processes of public 
accountability and governance (see chart 1).  
 
Genetic technology was taken up as a topic 
for debate in Denmark primarily by critical sci-
entists and science students. It was particu-
larly the group around the journal, Natur-
kampen (Nature Struggle), that first brought 
genetic engineering to public attention. As 
elsewhere, the technology was discussed in 
this first phase in relation to what might be 
termed the underlying theoretical implica-
tions, and, as in other countries, issues of sci-
entific responsibility and laboratory safety 
were also subject to debate.  
 
GM foods became much more controversial 
in the period of development, in the 1980s, at 
first in relation to events taking place abroad 
(mainly in the US) but more actively and lo-
cally, in the second half of the 1980s, in rela-
tion to the plans of the Danish Sugar Industry 
(De Danske Sukkerfabrikker, later Danisco) 
to develop and carry out field trials with GM 
sugar beets. The issue was framed almost 
exclusively in terms of environmental risks, 
and the environmental organization, NOAH, 
was particularly active. 
 
 
Genetically modified foods 
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The Danish parliament passed a law on ge-
netic technology and the environment in 1986 
– the first general GM law in the world - which 
included a ban on deliberate releases, al-
though the government could make excep-
tions in special cases. This rule was later re-
moved after a revision, paving the way for 
continued research in and development of 
GM sugar beets and later also other plants. 
 
There was a rather widespread public debate 
about GMOs in the 1980s, partly as part of an 
institutionalization of technology assessment, 
at both the universities (particularly the tech-
nological universities, where units for technol-
ogy assessment were established - in Aal-
borg and Copenhagen) as well as at the state 
level (where, among other things, the Danish 
Board of Technology was created). There 
were special funds allocated within the Bio-
technological Research Programme, which 
was initiated in 1987, for information activities 
about the new genetic technologies, and 
there were many meetings, publications, as 
well as larger research projects (such as 
Pegasus at the Danish Technological Univer-
sity, which was a broad assessment of the 
economic, social and environmental conse-
quences of biotechnology) (Jamison, 1990). 
 
From an accountability perspective, these 
activities were largely framed within what we 
have termed the “consensual regime”; indeed 
they were a central feature of the consolida-
tion of this regime in relation to technology 
policy. The idea was to ensure that as many 
different interests and interest groups as pos-
sible were represented in the discussions, in 
order to have a broad, consensual support for 
both the regulatory and support policies of the 
different ministries (environment, research 
and industry).  
 
Perhaps the most innovative Danish initiative 
from this period, and still one of the main ac-
tivities of the Board of Technology was, char-
acteristically enough, the arranging of so-
called Consensus Conferences (Consensus 
conferences have since become an interest-
ing case of “technology transfer” in relation to 
A brief history of gene technology assessment  
 
ca 1978 - 1984: scientific assessment (research phase) 
Debates about laboratory safety in relation to R-DNA experiments and the theoretical implica-
tions of genetic engineering, mostly carried out among scientists. In Denmark, a wing of the 
“radical science movement” was a key actor in this early phase. 
 
ca 1984 - 1996: risk assessment (development phase) 
Main issues: control and regulation of field experiments and product development; main actors 
were environmental organizations and technology assessors (both in academia, civil society, 
and government). In Denmark regulation is established and gene technology is discussed wi-
dely in the media and in the general public sphere. 
 
ca 1996 - : ethical assessment (diffusion and marketing phase) 
Discussion of political and ethical consequences of GM food product, including involvement of consumer organi-
zations, bioethics experts, public and private agriculture and industrial officials, as well as political parties and or-
ganizations. 
Chart 1: A brief history of gene technology assessment  
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public accountability and participation. Dan-
ish-style conferences have been held in a 
number of different countries, particularly 
over the past 5-10 years. In this respect, Dan-
ish accountability procedures have become 
an interesting source of public relations and 
even export income for the Danish govern-
ment). Consensus conferences are a staged 
assessment activity, where the aim is to turn 
the traditional power relations upside down. 
 
This is obtained by giving a group of lay peo-
ple the power to set the agenda for the as-
sessment and question selected experts be-
fore writing up a consensus document. As 
such consensus conferences can be seen as 
one among different deliberative instruments 
applied attempting to make gene technology 
accountable to the public. 
 
The first consensus conference was carried 
out in 1987, and addressed genetic technol-
ogy in industry and agriculture. Despite a 
great deal of attention given to this and sub-
sequent consensus conferences, their direct 
identifiable impact on GM food politics in 
Denmark, as in other countries, has been lim-
ited. The major contribution to the GM food 
politics is no doubt to be found in terms of the 
media attention they have created and thus 
the impacts on the discourses about gene 
technology. 
 
Following the intense debates in the 1980s, 
there was a pronounced decline in public as 
well as political attention towards GM foods in 
the early 1990s. This development coincided 
with a lower level of activity in NOAH, and 
institutionalized technology assessors - at the 
universities and ministries - more or less tak-
ing over the role that NOAH had had in terms 
of educating, or informing the public. In the 
food sector, Danisco continued their develop-
ment of GM sugar beets and the seed com-
pany Trifolium was developing GM fodder 
turnips. Industries like Chr. Hansen and Novo 
Nordisk also continued their development and 
production of enzymes and other agents for 
the food industry in this period. In 1996, a 
new phase ensued with the coming of GM 
food products to market, and new actors 
emerged, such as Greenpeace, but also or-
ganizations like Forbrugerrådet (The Con-
sumers Association) began to discuss GM 
issues. 
  
The low level of controversy characterizing 
the years from 1991 until 1996, can be ex-
plained in different ways. On the one hand, it 
has been suggested that the regulation was a 
result of traditional Danish consensus seek-
ing politics, ensuring that the regulation re-
flected and addressed the public anxiety 
(primarily understood in terms of risks to the 
environment and health). The absent conflict 
was hence an expression of the ”success” of 
public participation and information cam-
paigns in the 1980s. On the other hand, the 
low conflict level can also be seen as a con-
sequence of a shift in the process of innova-
tion, where GM food technologies around 
1990 tended to move from an “open” period 
of field trials into a more commercial and con-
cealed phase of product development.  
 
This state of things was, however, seriously 
disturbed when it became publicly known that 
GM soya was shipped from the US to Den-
mark and other European countries. This 
event served to reopen the controversy over 
GM foods. As it has been documented by 
surveys and qualitative studies in a number of 
European countries since the mid 1990s, the 
core of this controversy was a GM food in-
dustry, researchers and the majority of politi-
cians failing to understand and address the 
critique expressed by the public. As the con-
troversy was reopened in 1996, it became 
clear that the accountability procedures ap-
plied in the past - public participation in the 
shape of e.g. consensus conferences, infor-
mation activities and TA projects - were not 
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sufficient. A main reason for this, it was now 
recognized, was the failure to address the 
concerns of the public. In a way this demon-
strated that the participatory procedures - 
widely famed outside Denmark - had never 
really been taken seriously when it came to 
designing regulation or making decisions of 
importance for research and the development 
of GM foods. All in all it became clear that 
new procedures for ensuring an accountable 
research and technological development 
were needed. 
 
The failure of the political processes was not 
realized overnight. It was clearly demon-
strated by the debates in Folketinget (the Par-
liament) following the arrival of the soya. Al-
though never clearly formulated, the general 
opinion in the Parliament in 1996 was that the 
public rejection was irrational, since safety 
was ensured by the existing procedures in 
terms of regulation. At the political level the 
most important short-term outcome of the 
soya crisis was an attempt to restore public 
accountability of GM foods by agreeing that it 
should be official Danish policy in EU to pro-
mote efficient labeling schemes. In conse-
quence of this and in continuation of the gen-
eral perception that the public was (only) wor-
ried about environmental and health risks, the 
government joined the restrictive countries in 
EU in a moratorium of deliberate releases, 
awaiting implementation of new regulation 
ensuring segregation and defining a satisfac-
tory minimum level of GM contamination of 
non-GM foods. 
 
By taking this step, the Parliament tended to 
move the conflict from the political sphere to 
the market, making it a matter to be resolved 
in the relation between consumers and the 
producers/distributors. By this “marketization” 
of the conflict, accountability could be pro-
vided primarily by giving consumers the op-
tion to choose freely on the market – that is to 
choose to purchase the GM products or not. 
This can be seen as a response to what hap-
pened in 1996, when Monsanto had ignored 
consumers by denying the possibility of seg-
regation of GM and non-GM crops - much to 
the frustration of the wider public. Wider ethi-
cal concerns remained, however, ignored by 
the majority of the politicians. 
 
In the period following the soya crisis there 
are indications of a growing understanding 
among some politicians and policy makers of 
the complexity of the public attitudes to GM 
foods. This can be seen in the increased pub-
lic funding of bio-ethical research as well as 
an incipient understanding of the need for the 
inclusion of ethical assessments as the basis 
for approval of GM foods. One result of this 
new understanding was the establishment of 
the 'BioTIK' group, an expert group of phi-
losophers and other academics set up to 
sketch the frameworks of an ethical assess-
ment. The conclusions formed the basis of a 
report to the Parliament, which will be dis-
cussed in more detail below. 
 
Although bio-ethics in this way was estab-
lished as an area that had to be taken into 
account, and an ethical discourse developed 
outside narrow philosophical circles, specific 
actions, that is, the development of new ac-
countability procedures beyond “good inten-
tions” still remain to be taken. Neither Danish 
law nor EU regulation take account of any-
thing but environmental and health risks, and 
the use of labeling as a mandatory instru-
ment. 
 
The Danish food industry has been a rather 
silent actor after the soya crisis. Although 
there is evidence that they have products in 
the pipeline, to be marketed when/if public 
critique evaporates, they have not tried to 
promote these. Other industrial actors like 
Novo Nordisk (after 2000 Novozymes), pro-
ducing among other things GM enzymes to 
the food industry, have during the 1990s de-
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veloped a strategy of involving the public in 
their marketing and PR activity (see below).  
 
As we will see, one group of actors which has 
generally failed to develop appropriate public 
accountability procedures in relation to GM 
foods is the researchers. As we shall see 
later researchers tend to be portrayed as un-
scrupulous or in the pocket of industrial inter-
ests. This, and the fact that GM researchers 
depend on gene technology in a different way 
than industry and retailers who have gene 
technology as one option among others, may 
be the reason why we among plant biotech-
nologists still find a solid representation of the 
understanding that the public is irrational and 
ill informed about scientific facts (Meyer, 
2001). 
 
The policy process: 
developing an ethical 
discourse  
 
From the very start of the Danish debate, bio-
technology was discussed as an issue raising 
safety as well as wider social and ethical 
questions. The concerns were raised to the 
extent that Minister of the Interior in 1983 de-
cided to set up two committees to make ac-
counts of the need for regulation of safety is-
sues on the one side and ethical issues on 
the other.  
 
Gensplejsningsudvalget (The Committee for 
Genetechnology) was set up to suggest the 
organisation of public administration of the 
use of the new biotechnological processes 
with a specific focus on the risks to environ-
ment and humans. The mandate for the com-
mittee pointed out that ethical questions were 
not to be an aspect of the account, but would 
be "taken up in a broader context" (Indenrigs-
ministeriet, 1985). Interpreting this mandate, 
the committee dedicated their overall focus in 
the produced account to risks related to re-
search and production using gene technol-
ogy.  
 
In the account “Genteknologi og Sikker-
hed” (Gene Technology and Safety) the com-
mittee concluded that three separate acts 
were needed to regulate the risks of gene 
technology: an act addressing research, an 
act addressing uses in agricultural production 
and an act regulating the use of gene tech-
nology in products and production in general. 
 
Parallel to the work in Gensplejsningsudval-
get, the Udvalg om Etiske Probelmer ved 
Ægtransplantation, Kunstig Befrugtning og 
Foster Diagnostik (The Committee on Ethical 
Problems Regarding Transplantation, Artifi-
cial Insemination and Diagnostics) was set 
up. Apart from investigating ethical problems 
of the technologies mentioned in the title of 
the committee, the mandate also specifically 
instructed the committee to look into gene 
technology (Indenrigsministeriet, 1984).  
 
Although the mandate did not specifically ask 
the committee to limit its assessment of gene 
technology to human uses, gene technology 
was presented within a human/medical 
frame, leading the committee to interpret their 
mandate as limited to social and ethical as-
pects and the mentioned new diagnostic 
methods to the extent they are used or may 
be used on humans. Safety issues were ac-
cordingly not dealt with, but explicitly seen as 
belonging under the Gensplejsningsudvalget. 
Likewise ethical questions related to animals 
and plants although seen as ethically rele-
vant, were seen as falling outside the man-
date for the committee. In the report 
“Fremskridtets Pris” (The Price of Progress) 
the committee concluded that there was no 
need for a specific ethical regulation, but rec-
ommended instead the establishment of an 
advisory ethical committee within the human 
area. 
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As described here, the first initiatives from 
Danish authorities led not only to a separation 
of applications but also a separation of which 
concerns should be addressed in which con-
texts. In this way the different mandates and 
their interpretation by the two committees can 
be seen as both an illustration of the two 
dominant framings of the gene technological 
issue until the mid 1990s, but also as an im-
portant structuring force behind the develop-
ment of different framings (Andersen, 1992). 
 
In the following years, a tendency to split, or 
separate the discussions, and indeed the 
regulation, can be observed allowing for the 
development of two separate discourses: On 
the one hand a human-ethical discourse 
where the focus was on the ethical, and to 
some extent social questions pertaining to 
applications directly related to human uses. 
On the other hand a production-risk dis-
course, where the focus was on the risks to 
environment and human health. Although 
ethical questions regarding the use of ani-
mals and plants were recognized by both 
committees, such questions were excluded 
from the accounts and thus also largely from 
the following formal policy process and regu-
lation. In addition questions of microorgan-
isms and ethics were not raised by the two 
committees. 
 
Hence public authorities and government 
sought to ensure the accountability of gene 
technology in two different ways depending 
on the area of application. The political and 
regulatory structures constructed in the fol-
lowing years took up this split accountability: 
In relation to human applications, account-
ability of gene technology was to be ensured 
by a combination of the Det Etiske Råd (The 
Ethical Committee) set up in 1987 to advise 
public authorities (Indenrigsministeriet, 1987), 
and a number of laws and other regulatory 
initiatives. For GM foods and other uses of 
gene technology in production, accountability 
was largely reduced to the question of avoid-
ing risks - the means first of all being the laws 
on gene technology and environment and 
working environment (Miljøministeriet, 1987).  
 
Hence the accountability of GM foods was - 
in the political processes at parliament - 
mainly seen in the context of risks, whereas 
ethical and social issues were never seriously 
addressed. An exception from this picture 
was the Det Genteknologiske Råd (The Gene 
Technological Council) established in 1987, 
having a mandate that included risk as well 
as ethical issues. Ethical aspects became, 
however, never a key priority of the council, 
probably due to the dominance of biotech-
nologists: six representatives from biotechnol-
ogy and industry were appointed and only 
one from humanities (a pastor). By example 
the council did not take up ethical question in 
its first judgment of the Danish situation in 
1988, but only addressed limitation to the re-
search and industrial application (Det Gentek-
nologiske Råd, 1988). 
 
The somewhat ambivalent attitude towards 
GM foods (and other non-human applications 
of gene technology) expressed in the writings 
from the two committees was repeated in the 
parliamentary debates over gene technology. 
A telling example was a question in 1986 
asked of the Minister for the Environment, by 
a member of the Socialistisk Folkeparti 
(Socialist People’s Party, SF) concerning 
measures taken to keep humans and the en-
vironment free from risks (Folketinget, 1986). 
Although the question specifically was about 
risk issues, the opposition as well as the Min-
ister stressed that there were wider ethical 
concerns that needed to be addressed, as 
the Ministry put it: 
 
"Finally it is my view that there is a need to 
consider also ethical aspects. The Minister for 
the Interior has recently submitted a Bill ban-
ning certain experiments using genetic ma-
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nipulation on humans. Similar problems are 
raised in relation to animals and plants. To 
me there is a major difference between what 
science is capable of doing, and what we, 
keeping our basic philosophy of life in mind, 
will accept" (lbid.). 
 
The Minister promised to make the issues 
subject to public debate and consider how 
ethical questions outside the human area 
could be addressed in coming acts. Whereas 
the public debate was stimulated in the fol-
lowing years (see the following section), ethi-
cal questions were never taken up in the 
regulation set up in 1986, or in the subse-
quent revisions in 1989 and 1991. 
 
During the 1990s ethical questions beyond 
the human area began to appear in the wider 
political processes of gene technology. The 
Ethical Council on Animal Ethics (Dyre-etisk 
Råd), was e.g. established in 1991, given the 
task to oversee ethical questions in relation to 
animals - although the focus was on animal 
protection in a traditional sense, the council 
was also given the task to follow the gene 
technological development (Justitsministeriet, 
1991). In 1992 The Board of Technology 
hosted a conference on transgenic animals, 
specifically taking up ethical issues 
(Teknologinævnet, Teknologiske dyr. Indgreb 
i kønsceller på højerestående dyr. Teknologi-
nævnets rapporter 1993/1, København, 
1993). And in 1994 ethical issues were taken 
up during a parliamentary enquiry about la-
beling of GM foods and ingredients. The re-
sult being an unanimously adopted motion for 
an adjournment stating that it is Danish policy 
to avoid marketing for unlabelled GM foods in 
Denmark. The arguments were not only 
drawing on the risks of these products, but 
also on the consumers rights to a free choice 
- a freedom that could be expressed in a de-
sire to avoid GM products based also on ethi-
cal or religious concerns, as it was argued by 
the proposers from SF (Folketinget, 1994). 
The core of the parliamentary inquiry in 1994 
was however on technicalities of labeling, le-
gal issues and risks - there was still no devel-
oped ethical discussion of GM food matters. 
Following the re-opening of the controversy in 
1996 this picture did however change dra-
matically. A first sign of this was a debate in 
Parliament coinciding with the unloading of 
the first GM soya in Denmark. Here several 
speakers took up ethical questions as well 
specific questions in relation to the consum-
ers’ freedom of choice, the power of multina-
tionals, the third world and what benefits are 
considered legitimate. The most striking ex-
ample was a statement from the spokes-
woman from Kristeligt Folkeparti (The Chris-
tian Democrats), who elaborated on elements 
of an ethical assessment – this speech, how-
ever, did not evoke any particular resonance 
among the other parties. Although ethical 
questions were taken up focus remained on 
risks, technicalities of regulation and the use-
fulness of GM foods (Folketinget, 1996).  
 
Whereas the soya controversy primarily 
served as an eye-opener for the inability of 
the existing regulatory structures to cope with 
the concerns of the public, the announcement 
of the cloned sheep Dolly a few months later, 
added major elements of ethics to the parlia-
mentary debate. Now a central focus of the 
debate of GM foods was the ethical ques-
tions, leading to the following parliamentary 
decision: 
 
"Considering that: 
the biotechnological development raises ethi-
cal and environmental questions concerning 
humans, animals and plants and that 
human cloning is forbidden in Denmark in re-
search as well applied on humans 
The Parliament urge the Government to: 
Ensure that animal cloning is limited to re-
search 
Ensure experiments on full grown cloning is 
limited to the extent that no fully developed /
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subjects are produced. 
Ensure that cloning of domestic animals is 
not taking place 
(…) 
 
Before end of 1997 (…) work to find a method 
ensuring that intervention against develop-
ments offending the ethical norms of society 
can take place in due time; and that a founda-
tion for a renewed debate in the general pub-
lic as well as in Parliament of the ethical limi-
tation to research, is created" (Folketinget, 
1997).  
 
Neither Dolly nor the GM soya represent sur-
prises in a purely scientific sense: GM food 
like the cloning techniques had been subject 
to intense research and development activi-
ties in many countries for more than a dec-
ade. Regardless of this, they took the public 
by surprise and hence also the Parliament 
and public authorities, who had been working 
hard in the 1980s to construct frames ensur-
ing the accountability of GM foods. In a way 
the events after 1996 clearly demonstrated 
the goal of publicly accountable GM foods 
had not been reached, and it is in this light 
the urge to create the basic framework of an 
ethical debate about limits to research must 
be seen.  
 
In the area of GM foods, ethics thus diverged 
from risks in the sense that risks at the na-
tional level had been subject to continuous 
assessments, several accounts and parlia-
mentary enquiries and scientific reports; and 
internationally risk assessment was accepted 
as a scientific discipline. Unlike this the ethics 
of GM foods had never had national attention 
nor developed into an acknowledged scien-
tific discipline noticed by the political proc-
esses.  
 
Many had, as demonstrated above, stressed 
the importance ethical questions in relation to 
GM foods, but so far the issue had been allo-
cated to public debates and meetings - it was 
never taken seriously and made subject to 
e.g. research activities, parliamentary enquir-
ies or accounts. The period following the re-
opening of the controversy in 1996, can 
largely be understood as period, where the 
frameworks of a GM food-ethical discourse is 
under construction in the sense that a vo-
cabulary and taxonomy of ethical concerns 
related to GM foods is created by public au-
thorities and in Parliament. 
 
In the past, ethical and societal aspects of 
gene technology had primarily been taken up 
by Teknologirådet (The Danish Board of 
Technology), this changed after 1996, as the 
issues pops up in other contexts also. Among 
the most important new domain of debate 
and discursive construction was Erhvervsmin-
isteriet (The Ministry of Trade and Industry), 
who had previously only related to the gene 
technologies from a strictly business oriented 
point of view. Among the initiatives set up by 
the Minister was the so-called BioTIK group, 
a working group with 11 members counting 
philosophers, biologists, theologians, medical 
doctors and other academics who had been 
working in and around biotechnology. The 
task of the working group was to produce a 
discussion paper that could serve as the ba-
sis of a balanced debate and increase the 
understanding of the public concern.  
 
By the end of 1997 the working group pro-
duced the report De genteknologiske valg 
(The Gene Technological Choices) (BioTIK-
gruppen, 1997); a report, discussing issues 
(visions as well as problems) identified to be 
central for the decision making about gene 
technology. One outcome of the report was a 
suggestion of ethical criteria for development 
and application of gene technology, for the 
first time seriously integrating the different 
human and non-human applications and in-
cluding ethical, risks as well societal con-
cerns. 
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In March 2000, the minister of business pre-
sented a statement on ethics and gene tech-
nology to the parliament (The Danish Ministry 
of Trade and Industry, 2000). This statement, 
receiving general support among the political 
parties, repeated the conclusions of the re-
port from the working group, and stated the 
policy the government wanted to pursue. This 
included among other things 1) To work for 
an international convention on the inclusion of 
ethical considerations in the regulation of bio-
technology in plants and food. 2) To work for 
the inclusion of ethics in the in the regulation 
of gene technology, in particular ensure the 
inclusion of ethics in the revision of the EU-
directive on deliberate releases. 3) To de-
velop guidelines for ethical assessment of 
new biotechnological methods. 4) To support 
debate and information. 
 
One outcome of the statement was the estab-
lishment of the so-called BioTIK secretariat 
under the Ministry for Trade and Industry in 
2001. The secretariat joined nine ministries 
working for realizing the ambitions of the 
statement, that is on the one hand the incor-
poration of ethical principles in the regulation 
of and decision-making about biotechnology, 
and on the other hand the establishment of a 
basis for public consultation and information 
(See: www.biotik.dk).  
 
These attempts to twist the policy process in 
a more ethical direction, has, however not yet 
materialized themselves in significant regula-
tory changes. The 2002 revision of the central 
law in regulation GM foods, The Act on Gene 
Technology and Environment, does include 
ethics considerations, but, following the line 
of the revised EU directive for deliberate re-
lease, this is an open possibility, not manda-
tory (Miljøministeriet, 2002b).  
 
One of the substantial changes is a recent 
extension of the mandate of the Ethical Coun-
cil (Etisk Råd) to also cover non-human is-
sues – the status of the council has, however, 
not been changed as it is still consultative. In 
summary Danish bio-politics still is character-
ized by a strong utilitarian tradition, where 
risks to health and environment is weighed 
against the benefits, although discussions of 
basic ethical principles like autonomy, dignity, 
integrity and vulnerability are becoming inte-
grated elements (Rendtorff, 2000).  
 
The business arena: 
merging public and 
economic accountability  
 
Among the fist industrial movers on the bio-
technology arena in the early 1980s were the 
companies Novo and Nordisk Gentofte. Novo 
as well as Nordisk Gentofte had production of 
human insulin and other pharmaceuticals, 
and Novo, by far the larger of the two, had in 
addition industrial enzymes for the food sec-
tor and for the detergent industry as important 
areas of business.  
 
In 1984 Novo and Nordisk Gentofte almost 
simultaneously announced plans to develop 
and apply genetically modified organisms in 
the production of insulin respectively human 
growth hormone. It is characteristic of this 
early phase of development of gene technol-
ogy in Denmark, that both companies sur-
rounded their concrete plans with a high level 
of secrecy. At that time, there was no compul-
sory registration of research or other uses of 
gene technology in Denmark. Instead compa-
nies or researchers could, if they wished to, 
report their use of genetic manipulation to 
"Registre-rings-udvalget", where the reports 
were kept secret to the public (Toft, 1985).  
 
This strategy of relative secrecy must be 
seen in the light of the common understand-
ing that gene technology in itself is not differ-
ent from other technologies, hence regulation 
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should address the products, not the way 
they are produced (Kiel, 1984).  
 
Consequently there is also no need to go 
public with plans to apply gene technology 
and stimulate a debate – the secrecy may on 
the other hand also reflect a (at that time 
common) perception that avoiding public de-
bate is a useful strategy to ensure a peaceful 
business environment. The events surround-
ing Monsanto’s introduction of soya to the 
European market in 1996 proved this latter 
strategy wrong. 
 
The sudden announcement of concrete plans 
of application of gene technology in pharma-
ceutical production took most parties by sur-
prise, probably because the relative secrecy 
had left members of the public as well as 
NGOs and other actors on the political arena 
parties unaware of the advanced stage of the 
technology. One outcome was that the an-
nouncements became triggers for the first era 
of public debate of gene technology in Den-
mark. Another was that the productions plans 
themselves became subject to intense public 
attention, forcing both companies to engage 
in a public dialogue at some level. One ex-
pression of this (new) engagement with the 
public was pamphlets explaining the essen-
tials of gene technology and presenting the 
companies interests. Other expressions were 
the organizing or participation in public meet-
ings where Novo and/ or Nordisk Gentofte we 
confronted with opposing actors like NGOs or 
neighbors (Terney, 1986). 
 
It seems fair to say that from the starting point 
the dominant business strategy, as ex-
pressed by Novo and Nordisk Gentofte, was 
that since gene technology should be treated 
like any other technology, it needed not to be 
accounted for in any particular way. Just as 
the view was that no particular public ac-
countability was needed industries involved in 
gene technology, these industries supported 
the view that a specific regulation was not 
needed. In the years following the introduc-
tion of the Act on gene technology and envi-
ronment in 1986, the Association for Biotech-
nological Industries in Denmark (Foreninigen 
af Bioteknologiske Industrier i Danmark) 
counting companies like Novo, Nordisk Gen-
tofte, the breweries and sugar industry 
among its members, accordingly fought the – 
to their opinion - strict Danish regulations. 
One example being a comparative analysis of 
the level of regulation of biotechnology in dif-
ferent countries, published in the hope of in-
fluencing the parliament (Fink, 1988). The set 
off from this analysis was the notion that bio-
technological business in Denmark was im-
peded by the strict regulation, placing Danish 
industries in poorer position compared to their 
foreign competitors. 
 
By the late 1980s things started to change. 
Novo and Nordisk Gentofte merged into Novo 
Nordisk and went public with the view that 
regulation is not necessarily in contradiction 
to business interests. As such Novo Nordisk 
opposed not only many of their Danish broth-
ers in arms, but also the continued trend in 
the European biotech industry arguing that 
regulation is not in the interest of biotechno-
logical industries. Defending this view, repre-
sentatives of Novo Nordisk argued that there 
is no documentation for alleged reduced com-
petitiveness resulting from regulation. Instead 
the argument was that on the one hand regu-
lations provides a known and secure environ-
ment for production and on the other hand 
that regulation is seen as a means to ensure 
public acceptance of biotechnology (Kvist-
gaard, 1996).  
 
The shift indicates that to proactive industries, 
like Novo Nordisk, the public was not only 
perceived of in terms of consumers to be 
dealt with on the market, but also as citizens 
who have a say, eventually influencing the 
political processes and thereby the frames for 
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doing business. Hence public accountability 
became important to businesses like Novo 
Nordisk, who in the following years developed 
a charter and a strategy for their relations to 
the public and other stakeholders. The re-
mainder of the section shall exemplify this 
trend where business attempts to handle ‘the 
problem of the public’ in a proactive way out-
side the market by presenting elements of 
Novo Nordisk’s merger between economic 
accountability to the shareholders and this 
new broader understanding of accountability. 
 
The company structure of Novo Nordisk was 
changed in 2000, when the company 
demerged into Novo Nordisk and No-
vozymes. Today the Novo Group comprises 
Novo A/S as the holding company and the 
two operating companies Novo Nordisk A/S 
(pharmaceutical activities) and Novozymes A/
S (mainly enzyme business). Both are pub-
licly listed companies with Novo A/S as the 
controlling shareholder. The annual net turn-
over for the Novo group is approx. 26,000 mill 
DKK. Gene technology is the important basis 
for many of the activities in the Novo Group, 
but for our purpose Novozymes is the most 
interesting, since they cover the use of gene 
technological methods in the production of 
enzymes and other ingredients for food and 
feed production, besides their important pro-
duction of technical enzymes for the deter-
gent industries (The following is partly based 
on an interview with Kirsten Stær, No-
vozymes, 7 February 2003).  
 
As it will appear, Novozymes is, however, not 
totally independent since important frames for 
the business concerning values and strate-
gies are set up by Novo A/S. These frames 
are given in the Novo Group Charter, which 
set up values and commitments underlining 
the importance of the stakeholder dialogue 
and committing the companies to use the tri-
ple bottom line reporting for their activities. 
 
Statements about common values and com-
mitments are expressed in the Charter, which 
constitutes the basic criteria or framework for 
all companies in the Novo Group and their 
employees. The question of accountability is 
specifically addressed in one of the values in 
the Charter, where it says: ”Each of us shall 
be accountable – to the company, ourselves 
and society – for the quality of our efforts, for 
contributing to our goals and for developing 
our culture and shared values” (The Novo 
Group, Charter for companies in the Novo 
Group, no year). Such value commitments 
expand the understanding of what the em-
ployees and the company need to account 
for, far beyond the traditional economic obli-
gations. While many companies would proba-
bly approve of similar principles, and do their 
best to ensure that their sales are not af-
fected by criticized (that is unaccountable) 
actions, fewer explicitly work with values as 
The Novo Group attempt to do.  
 
The idea that accountability also stretches 
beyond what is of importance for market per-
formance and production costs, can be illus-
trated by three commitments included in the 
Charter, stressing commitment to be financial 
as well as social and environmental responsi-
ble. Essential parts of these commitments 
include maintenance of openness about prod-
ucts and processes (to the extent openness 
does not harm competition), and engagement 
in dialogue with stakeholders and the ambi-
tion to live up to the International Chamber of 
Commerce’s Business Charter for Sustain-
able Development as well as the UN declara-
tions on Human Rights and Biological Diver-
sity. 
 
The maintenance of social and environmental 
responsibility is hence important ingredients 
in the construction of the public image of No-
vozymes. One important tool to ensure this is 
the so-called triple bottom line accounting 
system. This system has over the last years 
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been developed by the companies in the 
Novo Group as a tool to measure and control 
the performance – and indeed report – not 
only economic aspects, but also environment, 
bioethical and social consequences of their 
business.  
 
The ideas of accounting for environmental 
performance and identify future environ-
mental aims is by no means unique to Novo, 
but has over the past decade been institution-
alized in the public regulation, e.g. requiring 
certain industries to make annual green ac-
counts (Miljøministeriet, 2002a). By expand-
ing this required task to also include social 
issues, the companies in the Novo Group 
joins, however, a smaller group of more inno-
vative companies. 
 
The basic idea in Novozymes’ environmental 
report is to describe environmental status 
based on a number of indicators like con-
sumption of resources, release of wastewater 
solid waste, the accidental release of GMOs, 
number of animals used for testing and the 
total contribution to environmental problems 
like the depletion of the ozone layer, acidifica-
tion and the global warming. 
 
The social report is made up in a similar way, 
identifying a number of indicators for social 
performance. These social indicators are all 
related to Novozymes as a workplace and 
include e.g. the distribution between the two 
sexes in different positions, average age of 
employees as well as the health and safety of 
employees (Novozymes, 2003). 
 
The reporting of social and environmental 
performance are both followed by identifica-
tion of long term and/or short term aims for 
the indicators, making these reports steering 
instruments in much the same way traditional 
accounts are used to make budgets and set 
goals for economic performance. To validate 
the quality of the selection of indicators and 
the calculation of the indicator values, No-
vozymes has in its most recent report in-
cluded audition of also environmental and 
social accounts by the same auditors who 
audited the economic accounts. 
 
The third important tool for Novozymes in 
their efforts for accountability is the dialogue 
with the surrounding society. Contrary to 
most other businesses, relations are not re-
duced to costumers and contractors in the 
production chain, instead all actors who might 
have an interest are acknowledged as rele-
vant stakeholders. Of particular interest in this 
context are roundtable discussions with 
NGOs. Within these discussions NGOs are 
invited to participate in a dialogues about the 
activities of Novozymes – the idea being that 
NGO can be a source of inspiration for strate-
gic decisions in the future. 
 
The importance of accountability for gene 
technological firms was demonstrated by the 
introduction of the first GM food products to 
the Danish market by Monsanto in 1996.  
 
Although the actual presence of GM soya in 
the shipments was marginal (2%), the han-
dling of the situation by Monsanto reinforced 
the public understanding of an multinational 
business attempting to force GM soya upon 
reluctant Danes and other Europeans against 
their will. By rejecting segregation and only 
too late being willing to engage in a dialogue 
with the critics and concerned, Monsanto 
helped pave the way for the second era of 
controversy over GM foods (Lassen, 2002).  
 
There is little doubt that the continuous effort 
to ensure and maintain public accountability 
by Novo Nordisk in the 1990s and the mem-
bers of the Novo Group in the last years also 
can be interpreted as a strategy to avoid the 
involvement in future controversies of similar 
kind.  
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That this strategy seems to work is indicated 
by the results of a survey carried out by the 
Union of Engineers in Denmark in 2000, 
where ethical and moral performance of 4 
major gene technological companies was ad-
dressed. In this survey Novo Nordisk came in 
second, only exceeded by Carlsberg, a well-
known contributor of major funding of science 
and culture for centuries (Institut for Konjunk-
turanalyse, 2000). It is, however, still unsure 
to what extent the strategy will preserve No-
vozymes and other companies in the Novo 
Group as targets of future biotech controver-
sies.  
 
This will on the one hand depend on their 
ability to maintain the stakeholder dialogue at 
a level, where critical stakeholders feel that 
their participation in the dialogue makes a 
difference – if not they may feel tempted to 
remove the critique and debate from the rela-
tively closed environment of the stakeholder 
dialogue and open a more public arena for 
debate and criticism of gene technological 
activities. On the other hand it will also de-
pend on the ability of companies in the Novo 
Group to develop methods to expand the so-
cial and ethical indicators in the triple bottom 
line accounting system so that they in the fu-
ture more specifically up take up some of the 
unquantifiable, particularly moral, concerns 
about gene technology shared by large parts 
of the public. 
 
The scientific arena: 
In search of publicly 
accountable research 
 
Throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s a 
number of national research programmes 
have supported biotechnological research 
(see Figure 1, p. 53). At first these pro-
grammes were minor investments in a poten-
tial technology, but by the mid 1980s, as the 
technologies were able to demonstrate its 
(economical and technical) usefulness in e.g. 
the production of enzymes and other pro-
teins, the public support became substantial. 
The parliamentary adaptation of the first ma-
jor biotechnological research and develop-
ment programme in 1986 marks the first turn-
ing point in public support of biotechnological 
research. From 1987 and onwards the public 
funding increases in size and follow a set 
strategy. For an overview see the inserted 
table. 
 
It is not surprising that the main interest and 
focus of public funding in the years after 1987 
was to advance the natural scientific knowl-
edge, just as it was in the preceding pro-
grammes. As an illustrative example the first 
research programme (Undervisningsministe-
ren, 1986) allocated approximately 480 mill. 
DKK over four years expecting a similar pri-
vate funding of the research activities. 
 
Recognizing that Denmark is too small a 
country to cover all aspects of biotechnology, 
the idea was to build capacities in areas 
where Danish industry already had a strong 
basis. The areas identified by the parliament 
included agriculture, food production and con-
tained uses – clearly referring to the economi-
cally significant agri-food, pharmaceutical and 
enzyme sectors. The focus of the programme 
was partly on the production of PhDs and 
graduate students and partly on the establish-
ment of a research infrastructure concentrat-
ing efforts in fewer research centers address-
ing issues like methods and processes, farm 
animal production, food production, food pro-
duction and the prevention of diseases.  
 
This line was continued in the second re-
search programme (Forskningsrådenes ud-
valg vedr. bioteknologi, 1990), building, as it 
was said, “on the best of the activities initi-
ated under the former programme” and 
(again) emphasizing the importance of the 
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private sector, when specifying the important 
role of businesses in organizing and partici-
pating in the utilization of the results. As the 
table shows, the consecutive programmes on 
biotechnology has ensured annual public 
support of 50-150 mill. DKK for basic re-
search, education and (industrial) application 
ever since the first programme. 
 
This focus of the research must be seen in 
the context of Denmark, lacking rich natural 
resources apart from the agricultural land 
(and some North sea fossil fuels), increas-
ingly dependent on a production of products 
and services with a high content of scientific 
knowledge. Hence the importance to the 
Danish government facilitating a research 
keeping abreast of the international techno-
logical development.  
 
Consequently the so-called new biotechnol-
ogies were visualized as (necessary) means 
to maintain a modern industrial production, as 
it is stated by the minister for the environment 
in a parliamentary enquiry on biotechnology 
in general in 1986: “Denmark has excellent 
possibilities for a position among the leading 
nations in the world [when it comes to utilizing 
biotechnology], to create a competitive pro-
duction, to enter new markets and to earn 
much needed foreign exchange and good 
jobs. We can of course not reject this possi-
bility” (Folketinget, 1986).  
 
Supporting biotechnological research has a 
natural role in these framings of the issue, 
almost making it a precondition for mainte-
nance of the welfare state. Such arguments 
draw heavily in the construction of biotechnol-
ogy as an economic necessity and conse-
quently almost taking their economic account-
ability for granted: they are indisputable 
sources of wealth and therefore economically 
accountable. The pure technical and natural 
scientific research was, however, not the only 
aspect of biotechnology that was supported in 
the period until 1996. As described previ-
ously, the critical debate grew alongside the 
increasing research and industrial. Reflecting 
this criticism, some of the research pro-
grammes included aspects of technology as-
sessment, safety research and information/ 
dialogue. At several occasions the public con-
cern is directly referred to as a reason for in-
cluding this perspective in the research pro-
grammes - as in the description of the second 
major programme, where it is said:  
 
“Considering the anxiety entertained by the 
population concerning if the limits to what is 
seen as desirable research are transgressed, 
it is important to be open about research and 
inform about its methods and results. Further-
more continuous assessment of methods and 
results is important (…) including broader 
technology assessments clarifying the im-
pacts of the research results on other aspects 
of the social life, including the economy. Fur-
thermore the assessment must include ethi-
cal aspects of the research, seen from the 
point of view of the individual, the nature and 
the environment in general” (Udvalget Vedrø-
rende Bioteknologi, 1992). 
 
The first major contribution to such technol-
ogy assessment activities were allocated in 
the first programme, but not with the tacit 
consent of the conservative led minority gov-
ernment. During the Parliamentary debates of 
the proposition, the red-green majority forced 
the government to allocate 20 mill. DKK to 
information and technology assessment. 
Compared to funds for the natural scientific 
research the amount for assessment and in-
formation here, like in other programmes, 
was small, but they did secured the continua-
tion of assessment activities like those initi-
ated by the Technology Council under the 
Ministry for Industry in 1982, when they sup-
ported the Pegasus project carried out at the 
Technical University.  
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The establishment of the Parliamentary 
Board of Technology in 1986 (once again 
against the will of the government), and the 
Social Scientific Research Council’s (SSF) 
initiation the technology-society initiative, in-
creased the focus on technology assessment 
– including assessment of biotechnology. All 
in all the 1980s was characterized by the de-
velopment of technology assessment as a 
method and the accomplishment of a number 
of technology assessment activities dealing 
with of different aspects of biotechnology. 
 
The relative quietness surrounding the bio-
technological issues in the first half of the 
1990s could, as discusses in the previous 
section, be interpreted as the result of not 
only the successful establishment of the na-
tional (and EU) regulation, but also of the car-
rying out of assessment activities intending to 
make biotechnological research and develop-
ment accountable to the public.  
 
As indicated by the quotation from the de-
scription of the second research and develop-
ment programme, an underlying idea seemed 
to be that the assessment activities should 
run parallel to the biotechnological research 
in order to utilize the results in the biotechno-
logical research. This interpretation is con-
firmed by the call for applications, where pri-
ority was given to projects that assess issues 
related to the supported biotechnological re-
search. 
 
The re-emergence of the controversy in 1996, 
must, however, also be seen in the light of 
the inability to efficiently connect the assess-
ment activities and the biotechnological re-
search.  
 
Instead of business adjusting it activities ac-
counting for the issues (beyond environment 
and health covered by the regulation) raised 
by the assessments, it continued more or less 
as if nothing had happened. This was particu-
larly true for the GM-food related business 
apparently living a life of its own, only occa-
sionally confronting the broader concerns 
raised in e.g. the media.  
 
Consequently the assessment activities never 
really directly influenced the development 
path taken in the biotechnological research 
and development – indirectly they can, how-
ever, be judged to have had some impacts on 
the development of the critical discourses in 
the society as such first of all in shape of a 
continuous supply of (new) areas of concern 
but also in securing a base for the critical dis-
course at the universities. 
 
After the controversy re-appeared in 1996, 
this problem was also addressed in the public 
funding of biotechnological research. This 
was e.g. stressed in the National Strategy for 
Biotechnological Research from 1998, where 
it was stated that: “The development of bio-
technology must take place in a way that re-
assures the public. This requires that ethical 
and legal aspects are systematically as-
sessed and reviewed through independent 
research in close dialogue with the biotechno-
logical researchers and relating to the actual 
research” (Forskningsministeriet, 1998). De-
spite these intentions, the national strategy 
did not point to how this closer link between 
assessment and biotechnological research 
should be put into praxis. Some suggestions 
were, however present in some of the re-
search programmes in the period after 1996. 
 
First of all the programmes took up the heavy 
focus on basic and applied research but they 
also suggested new organizations of the as-
sessment activities. Within the programme 
National Staking on Biotechnology running 
from 1999 until 2002, priority was given to “…
interdisciplinary research, as far as possible 
based on collaboration with biotechnological 
research groups. The main aim of the activi-
ties is to produce knowledge and results that 
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are to the benefit of public authorities and 
business activities within the biotechnological 
area” (Forskningsstyrelsen, 1998). Similar 
lines were laid out in the call from the Ministry 
for Food, Agriculture and Fisheries for appli-
cation in the programme “Biotechnology in 
Food Research”. Here it was stressed that 
the part of the programme supporting re-
search into the attitudes and assumptions of 
consumers, should establish a dialogue to the 
biotechnological research projects supported 
under the programme (Ministry of Food, Agri-
culture and Fisheries op cit, 1997).  
 
Partly based on the funds from these latter 
programmes, a research Centre for Biotech-
nology and Risk Assessment (CeBRA) was 
established. CeBRA was launched in 2000 to 
perform research into two biotechnological 
areas: genetically modified crops and geneti-
cally modified research animals (See: http://
www.bioethics.kvl.dk/eindex.htm).  
 
For the first time research into biotechnology 
as well as public perceptions and ethics tak-
ing place at seven major Danish research in-
stitutions were joined in the same research 
center. Apart from issuing a newsletter 
(“Gene-ethics in Praxis”) and arranging joint 
workshops for the involved projects, it is re-
quired that a third of the scientific articles 
from each project are result of interdiscipli-
nary research. The will to go beyond the bio-
technological research was further demon-
strated as the institutions behind the center 
after the end of the ministry funds decided to 
support the center for another five years.  
 
The relation between the biological scientists 
and the public constitutes a serious problem 
for this and other activities to move the bio-
technological research in a more accountable 
direction. Recent research has thus demon-
strated that there is a significant skepticism 
towards the biotechnological scientific com-
munity.  
In a survey in 1996, 71% of the asked Danes 
tended to agree in the following statement: 
“irrespective of the regulation, biotechnolo-
gists will do whatever they like” (John Durant 
et al., eds, Biotechnology in the public 
sphere, Science Museum, London 1998, 
p.261). A reasonable hypothesis is that this 
extremely low level of accountability partly 
can be explained by the unwillingness to let 
social science or humanities seriously influ-
ence the biotechnological research agenda. 
 
The civic arena: 
nongovernmental  
organizations 
 
As in most other industrialized countries sig-
nificant segments of the Danish public, in the 
course of the 1960s and 1970s, expressed 
concern over the dominant forms of techno-
logical development and their environmental 
“side effects”. In the 1970s, this was primarily 
related to the development of nuclear tech-
nology and the pollution and waste problems 
associated with industrial production and agri-
culture (Jamison, 1990).  
 
As a result, a number of new environmental 
organizations came to be established in Den-
mark, and by the 1980s, some of them 
started to interest themselves in genetic tech-
nology. As mentioned earlier, it was critical 
scientists who first drew attention to the po-
tential risks and benefits of biotechnology. An 
actual debate did not develop until 1984, 
when Novo and Nordisk Gentofte announced 
plans to develop gene technology in pharma-
ceutical production.  
 
As described in the previous sections this 
awakened a public debate and concern over 
pharmaceutical applications but later also GM 
foods. Together with the ongoing preparation 
of the regulation of gene technology, this 
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opened the way for the development of or-
ganized critique in the NGOs. 
 
In the following years NOAH became the 
most important environmental movement or-
ganization attempting to represent the con-
cerns of the public. NOAH played throughout 
the 1980s a role as public watchdog, critically 
partaking in the policy processes in relation to 
both the development of a national legislative 
structure, the EU regulation and the first ap-
plications for industrial production and delib-
erate release.  
 
With its decentralized structure and focus on 
“counter-expertise” NOAH can be described 
as a mild form of participatory protest organi-
zation (Diani, 1999).  
 
As such NOAHs activities in relation to gene 
technology in the following years included 
participation in the political process in relation 
to the setting up of the regulatory framework 
and the applications for deliberate release of 
sugar beets.  
 
Although many proponents of gene technol-
ogy were critical of NOAH in these years, the 
form of action was by no means radical in the 
sense that they broke, or violated any laws. 
NOAH saw it as its most important task to 
inform the public about these new technolo-
gies – and indeed did so by arranging and 
participating in many public meetings and 
continuous publication of books and articles 
(Halkier, 1984, Toft, 1985). 
 
During the 1980s NOAH enjoyed a virtual 
monopoly, when it comes to an organized 
critique of biotechnology. None of the other 
“new social movement” organizations dealing 
with consumer, environmental, third world or 
other issues where the question of gene tech-
nology was potentially important, were par-
ticular active - and most (if not all) had no pol-
icy about gene technology policy at all. In 
terms of accountability, NOAH played thus an 
important role in these first years of the con-
troversy.  
 
Firstly NOAH came to be a force stimulating a 
continuous public debate over gene technol-
ogy – in writings and through practical action 
NOAH constituted one of the actor groups 
demanding accountability beyond the eco-
nomical and technical usefulness of GM 
foods as of other applications of gene tech-
nology.  
 
Secondly NOAH came to be the critical voice 
- invited or not - participating in the gene-
political processes. As such NOAH was the 
de facto representative of the public in the 
political processes – this does not necessarily 
mean that NOAH represented the public con-
cern, but rather that since there were no other 
organized forms of representation, NOAH 
was the one involved.  
 
Thirdly these roles, together with NOAH’s 
educational strategy also gave them a role in 
the development of the critique of GM foods 
in the general public. Not that they alone set 
the agenda and provided information, but 
NOAH’s monopoly gave them some impact 
on what was needed of the political process 
to make GM foods public accountable. 
 
From the start NOAH, first of all having an 
identity as an environmental – and to some 
extent a consumer - movement, were most 
active and visible in relation to risk related 
concerns.  
 
They did, however, also raise concerns out-
side risks to environment and health and 
translated e.g. a book dealing with GM foods 
in a third world perspective, presenting GM 
foods as a new green revolution (Hobelink, 
1988) and co-organized a conference on 
gene technology and intellectual property 
(ICDA Seeds Campain, 1989).  
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Although NOAH in this way also voiced the 
economic critique and some of its aspects of 
power, justice and exploitation they never had 
the success to move the core of the public 
debate in the media and political processes 
away from the heavy focus on risks clearly 
dominating the 1980s. 
 
As the EU regulation is set up in 1990-91 and 
implemented in the Danish regulation NOAHs 
disappeared slowly from the public arena, 
coinciding with a general decline in level of 
controversy over gene technology in the first 
half of the 1990s. This left open a space for 
other NGOs, first of all Greenpeace 
(established in Denmark in 1982) and to 
some extent Forbrugerrådet (The Consumers 
Association, FR) and Naturfredningsforenin-
gen (the Society for the Conservation of Na-
ture, DN).  
 
Despite this, it was not before 1996/97 follow-
ing the soya landings and the birth of Dolly, 
that NGOs were visible on the GM food are-
nas again. After the reopening of the contro-
versy, a number of organizations joined 
Greenpeace, FR and DN in taking over after 
NOAH who now slowly also was building up 
again.Most of these new organizations were 
small single-issue organizations devoting 
their energy combating gene technology.  
 
They included e.g. Oplysning om 
Genteknologi (Information about Gene tech-
nology, OOG) and Organisationen mod 
gensplejsede fødevarer) (the Organization 
Against GM foods, OGF). Typically disap-
pearing after a short period of activity, or to 
the extent they existed over longer timer, vir-
tually without any impact on debate or poli-
tics.  
 
Among the new organizations was however 
one, Danmarks Aktive Forbrugere (Active 
Consumers in Denmark, DAF) which proved 
to be viable and has together with Green-
peace been among the most influential and 
visible NGOs in the area in the years since 
1996.  
 
In an analysis of public accountability, it is 
however interesting to notice that while the 
political interpretation of the pressure for ac-
countability moves towards ethical issues 
(see previous section on the development of 
an ethical discourse in the political process), 
these dominant NGOs maintained the risk 
focus of the 1980s. DAF as well as Green-
peace have identities as environmental 
NGOs and as such they both place their cen-
tral focus on the environmental risks. 
 
At first sight this looks like a sort of tacit divi-
sion of labor among the NGOs. Environ-
mental NGOs like Greenpeace and DAF con-
centrate on environmental issues, and leave 
other issues to other organizations, who has 
this aspects within their resorts. A closer look 
at the NGO landscape and activities demon-
strates, however, a rather patchy division of 
labor.  
 
The dimensions that have been referred to as 
the discourses of economic concern and cul-
tural concern, supplementing the concerns 
about the risks, are not fully covered by the 
presently active NGOs (Jesper Lassen & An-
drew Jamison, “Genetic technologies meet 
the public. Discourses of concern”, forthcom-
ing in Science Technology and Human Val-
ues).  
 
The economic concerns dealing with issues 
of profitability and production and raising con-
cerns like economic costs/benefits, power 
and responsibility is covered by a number of 
organizations. Exploitation of poorer develop-
ing countries is e.g. an issue taken up by the 
development organization Mellemfolkeligt 
Samvirke (MS) who tend to dominate the GM 
food issues this respect. Wider consumer is-
sues like concerns about consumers’ right to 
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choose on a free market or impacts on food 
prices that are typically issues dealt with by 
the traditional consumers’ organizations.  
 
What might be termed the discourse of cul-
tural concern, that covers religious and moral 
aspects raising concerns over e.g. ethics or 
rights, is poorly covered by NGOs. In a round 
of interviews with some of the most visible 
NGO in 2000, none of these took up the is-
sues of naturalness of GM plants or animals. 
Similarly the dominant animal welfare NGO, 
Foreningen til Dyrenes Beskyttelse (the Soci-
ety for the Protection of Animals, DB) has 
been strikingly silent in relation to GM foods.  
 
As a result of this utilitarian approach where 
usefulness is measured against suffering, 
animal integrity of trespassing limits to nature 
seemingly does not play any particular role. 
 
The overall picture is that Danish NGOs activ-
ity in relation to GM foods focus on risks and 
economic concerns, whereas the cultural 
concerns seem to have been left out. Differ-
ent circumstances may explain this situation. 
 
Firstly it has been of importance that all pow-
erful GM-food related NGOs have had their 
core identity as environmental, consumer or 
other movements dealing with specific issues. 
As a consequence of this NGO landscape, no 
strong single issue NGO working with GM 
foods and who potentially could take up all 
three discourses of concern has existed. In-
stead GM food aspect has been taken up as 
a side concern to the extent it is included in 
the interests of the NGO.  
 
Secondly, there is no tradition for taking up 
such cultural concerns by the movements 
carrying the critique of food production and 
techno-science in general, rather the focus is 
on risks and economics. In relation to the cul-
tural concerns related to nature and unnatu-
ralness this is partly a result of the almost to-
tal absent deep-ecology movement in Den-
mark. On the other hand it is also an expres-
sion of the rather secular traditions in Den-
mark, where the church and its organizations 
in the latter half of the 20th century, not organ-
ized in a synodic structure, have not involved 
themselves in political matters – hence the a 
potential religiously rooted critique has also 
had poor conditions. 
 
Since 1996 we have therefore had the pecu-
liar situation in Denmark, that although there 
has been a political openness to ethical con-
cerns in the political process, this has only 
been partly been filled out by NGOs. To the 
extent the parliament and public authorities 
are not able to make GM foods accountable 
in the cultural sense by themselves, the fact 
that there is no organized expression of this 
discourse, may eventually result in another 
reduction of the interpretation of the public 
concern and thus failure to make biotechnol-
ogy publicly accountable. At the core of this 
problem is the fact that most NGOs active in 
the area have reached a state in their devel-
opment, where they have detached them-
selves from their original roots in the public, 
and live a life of their own, where they do not 
necessarily need to account for their actions 
and views to the public.  
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Summary 
 
The case study deals with the development of 
the Metro light-train project in Copenhagen 
and of the new city area, Ørestad, that is to 
be serviced by the train. The project is de-
scribed as an example of a new approach to 
urban planning, and an illustration of Danish 
consensus politics in action. 
 
The study relates the historical development 
of the project, how the plans were made in 
the late 1980s, and briefly traces the process 
of implementation in the 1990s, focusing on 
conservation issues that emerged, as well as 
the choice of technology for the Metro sys-
tem. 
 
A number of issues related to public account-
ability are then discussed in more detail. In 
particular, questions of openness, consulta-
tion, and cost-accounting are taken up. The 
treatment of the project in the media is also 
briefly analyzed. 
 
The case is an all too typical example of in-
adequate procedures of public accountability 
in relation to large infrastructure projects. 
Lack of openness and involvement of rele-
vant stakeholders in the decision-making and 
implementation process are striking features 
of the case.  
 
 
Introductory background 
 
The Ørestad/Metro project is an example of a 
new approach to urban planning that has be-
come popular throughout Europe over the 
past two decades, according to which cities 
are seen as sites of “strategic growth”. Ac-
cording to this perspective, cities and infra-
structural developments are to be seen as 
“motors” or driving forces for economic 
growth and commercial competitiveness, and 
public policy thus becomes primarily a matter 
of managing this growth potential by using 
techniques and procedures that are derived 
from the business world. Public administra-
tion becomes a form of corporate activity. 
 
New regional accumulation, or strategic 
growth, strategies have come to be seen by 
many local politicians and public officials as 
providing the basis for urban renewal and re-
vitalization in cities that have lost much of 
their industrial base and industrial work-
places. Urban Development Programmes 
(UDP), such as the one that was devised for 
the Copenhagen region, became important 
instruments of public policy. UDPs involve so-
called public-private partnership (PPP) rather 
than traditional forms of decision-making: 
multilevel governance rather than top-down 
government. 
 
In Denmark, these ideas came to be influen-
tial in policy circles in the course of the 
1980s, particularly within a political “growth 
coalition” which consisted of leading repre-
sentatives from the Social Democratic, Con-
servative and Liberal Parties, the largest par-
ties in the Parliament, together representing 
Regional/local transport policy: 
the Ørestad/Metro project 
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some 70-75 percent of the electorate. As part 
of what we have previously termed a consen-
sual regime of public accountability proce-
dures, plans for the strategic growth of the 
Copenhagen area were formulated by means 
of a negotiation process among leading politi-
cians and officials from these three parties.  
 
Those plans included the bridge across the 
Øresund between Sweden and Denmark, a 
new urban area to be located near the Co-
penhagen airport and what would be the 
bridgehead to Sweden – the so-called 
Ørestad on the island of Amager – and a light 
rail connection, the Metro, linking Ørestad to 
the city center. In this case study we recount 
the history and discuss issues of public ac-
countability associated with the Ørestad/
Metro project.  
 
Urban planning in Denmark had previously, in 
the 1950s and 1960s - the era of the postwar 
welfare state - been characterized by func-
tionalism and ”goal rationality”: cities were 
adminstered and projects planned in such a 
way that they could serve and contribute to 
the general public welfare. The Danish plan-
ning system was hierarchical, which meant 
that municipal planning was under the juris-
diction of regional planning authorities and, 
most especially, subject to decisions taken in 
the national parliament.  
 
With the coming to power of the Conserva-
tive/Liberal Government in 1982, and the new 
doctrines of strategic urban growth, the plan-
ning system changed character. What had 
previously been based on bureaucratic forms 
of administration, with formalized procedures 
of accountability, was changed to a more fluid 
form of administration with more informal pro-
cedures of accountability.  
 
The shift can be characterized in terms of a 
general weakening of the exercise of 
”government”, which involves a relatively cen-
tralized political decision-making structure 
and a legally separate sphere of public ad-
ministration. The more fluid system of plan-
ning can instead be seen as part of a more 
general shift toward the strengthening of a 
more multifarious realm of ”governance”, by 
which public authorities are accountable to 
different networks and “stakeholders”, and, in 
particular, by which public officials often con-
duct their activities in close relation to busi-
ness, without clearly delineated hierarchies. 
 
 In theory, this shift has been conceptualized 
as the shift from one or another form of indus-
trial, or modern society to something else: 
risk society (Beck), knowledge society 
(Stehr), network society (Castells).  
 
Whatever it is called in theory, there can be 
no doubt that in practice, the boundaries be-
tween public and private, between politics 
and administration, have tended to diminish 
and become increasingly blurred in relation to 
“mega projects” such as the Metro/Ørestad 
(Flyvbjerg, 2003). Instead, multilevel govern-
ance and public-private partnerships gain im-
portance in this new approach to planning.  
 
The decision-making  
process  
 
The specific motivation for the Metro/Ørestad 
project was the need to revitalize the econ-
omy of the Danish capital city. Like many 
comparable cities around Europe and North 
America, Copenhagen experienced a loss of 
much of its industrial base during the 1970s 
and 1980s: some 50,000 industrial work-
places had disappeared. When the Parlia-
ment in 1988 decided to move the Holmen 
naval base from Copenhagen to Jutland, the 
politicians realised that something needed to 
be done to generate new growth in the Capi-
tal.  
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The Liberal Party, which primarily repre-
sented Jutland farmers, was eager to move 
public institutions (such as the naval base), 
away from the capital to the provinces 
(Interview with David Rehling). 
  
To achieve support for their plans, the liberals 
needed to give something back to the city, 
and, in particular, the parties that represented 
the urban political culture – the conservatives 
and Social Democrats (In the initial profile, we 
refer to the fact that Denmark is divided into 
two political cultures, based in the cities and 
the countryside, respectively, which provide 
the historical basis for the consolidation of a 
consensual regime in decision-making in the 
period after the second world war, which has 
strongly influenced public accountability pro-
cedures). 
 
It was the Social Democrats, in opposition at 
the time, that presented the contours of a 
compromise plan in the spring of 1989. Only 
one month later the conservative prime minis-
ter presented his own plan for “Growth and 
Progress”, which, somewhat immodestly, was 
called by the Government, ”the Plan of the 
Century.” Both the Social Democrats and the 
Conservatives seemed to agree that some-
thing needed to be done for the capital, and 
so a committee was formed in order to come 
up with some proposals. 
 
Infrastructure was given high priority in the 
subsequent report (the Stallknecht Report), 
submitted in November 1989, and the con-
struction of a bridge to Sweden was seen as 
especially important. The conservative prime 
minister Poul Schlüter was supportive of the 
committee’s idea about a “Nordic Growth 
Centre” around the Øresund strait.  
 
The Øresund region (including Copenhagen, 
Malmö and Lund) was seen to have a great 
growth potential, due to a highly skilled labour 
force, a comparatively clean environment, 
several universities on both sides of the strait, 
lots of land for shopping malls, hotels and 
sports facilities, and an extensive and sophis-
ticated infrastructure, especially in terms of 
communication and information technology 
facilities. 
 
The Stallknecht Report called also for a new 
administrative structure in the capital region, 
which was necessary since the parliament 
had decided to close down the Greater Co-
penhagen Council (Hovedstadsrådet, HR), 
which was a representative body with mem-
bers from different county and municipal au-
thorities. This meant that there was no longer 
a central authority that had overall planning 
responsibility in the region. A major parlia-
mentary debate in March 1990 highlighted 
the capital’s problems.  
 
Both the conservatives and the Social De-
mocrats stressed the need for growth and 
development in Copenhagen, very much in 
line with the Stallknecht Report. Hence first 
priority was to be given to a fixed connection 
from Zealand to Sweden. To deal with the 
regional policy and development the prime 
minister set up “The Capital Development 
Council” (Hovedstadens Udviklingsråd, HUR) 
as a kind of development company run by 
national politicians (Hansen, 1992, Abild, 
2002). 
 
The municipality of Copenhagen was not ea-
ger to take part in the development com-
pany’s work, however, perhaps because 
there was another committee in operation, 
the Würtzen committee, which was to pro-
pose measures for dealing with traffic prob-
lems in the capital region.  
 
However, and perhaps because of the failure 
of the political development company, a small 
group within the Würtzen committee decided 
for themselves, after the parliamentary de-
bate in March 1990, that the questions of 
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growth, development and innovation, should 
be integrated with the committee’s traffic is-
sues. They formed a partnership of three and 
constructed the Ørestad/Metro project. 
 
The three, who would become the project se-
cretariat, were Anne-Grethe Foss, head of 
the planning department in the Danish State 
Railways (DSB), Dan Christensen, architect 
in the municipality of Copenhagen and Erik 
Jacobsen, head of the department in the Min-
istry of Finance.  
 
They suggested that the money needed for 
traffic investments could be raised from the 
sale of land in the area near the bridge if the 
new area in Copenhagen had high-quality 
infrastructure (light-rail). The land would be 
attractive due to a light rail connection (later: 
the Metro). The Ørestad was to be built on 
Amager, an island in the southern part of Co-
penhagen, close to the airport, the bridge and 
not far from the inner city. 
 
There were some problems with their idea. 
For one thing, much of the area had the 
status of a nature reserve, and the Ørestad 
would also be in violation of the regional de-
velopment plan, which had not proposed a 
new urban district in the area. But these were 
to be only minor problems, due to the fact 
that the Copenhagen municipality approved 
of the idea – and because of the elimination 
of HR, the municipal government became the 
responsible authority. 
 
The secretariat constructed this win-win pro-
ject, the Ørestad. If you could supply West 
Amager with sufficient quality communica-
tions, i.e. a high technological Metro, you 
would be able to sell the land at exorbitant 
prices (Interview with Ulrik Dahlin). 
 
The official launching of the Ørestad project 
was the Würtzen committee report, published 
in March 1991. It was a popular proposal for 
city officials, who could neither raise funds for 
traffic or for strategic growth. As one city offi-
cial put it, 
 
There’s nothing wrong with the organisation 
and financing model for the Ørestad. Now we 
have the Metro that we have needed for so 
many years, and without cutting in the public 
service (Interview with Eskild Tuesen). 
 
Later it was realised that the Ørestad plan 
was similar to a much earlier project idea 
about the future of West Amager from 1965. 
That project had been conceived by architect 
Knud E. Rasmussen, since 1987 head of the 
planning office in the Copenhagen municipal 
government.  
 
In 1965 K.E. Rasmussen believed in a growth 
centre in Copenhagen, and in his opinion Co-
penhagen should compete with other cities 
like Göteborg, Hamburg and Stockholm. In 
the early 1960s many town planners saw the 
Øresund region as a potential Nordic Growth 
Centre. The Ørestad Plan, as proposed in the 
Würtzen committee, was, according to archi-
tect Arne Gaardmand, more or less a copy of 
the 1965 plan, which is not so surprising 
since Christensen had worked many years for 
Rasmussen (Interview with Arne Gaard-
mand). 
  
Mayors of Copenhagen have had strong feel-
ings about West Amager, ever since the land 
was reclaimed from the sea in the 1930s. The 
present mayor, Jens Kramer Mikkelsen (S) 
was also keen to the Ørestad idea, which was 
said to be tax neutral and bring new prosper-
ity to the Copenhagen area. The same feel-
ings were shared by the prime minister and 
the parliamentary opposition, led by the So-
cial Democratic Party leader Svend Auken. 
 
Anne-Grethe Foss chose to keep the plan 
secret, because of the County’s Social De-
mocrats (...) She gets the Minister of Finance, 
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Henning Dyremose and Poul Nyrop Rasmus-
sen [the future Social Democratic prime min-
ister] to make a political agreement, by which 
the technical aspects of the bridge – 4 track 
highway and two track railway – are settled. 
From this point nothing can be changed. 
When the political deal is made, it’s beyond 
the point of no return (Interview with Per Hen-
riksen). 
 
The Ørestad/Metro plans were disclosed in 
the newspaper Politiken in February 1991, 
one month before the report was supposed to 
be published. When the report was published 
the public learned that the other committee 
members were also not aware of the Ørestad 
plan. Only the three members of the secre-
tariat knew about the plans. The Minister of 
Finance, Henning Dyremose, soon became a 
spokesman and promoter for the Ørestad 
plan together with the mayor in Copenhagen, 
Kramer Mikkelsen.  
 
Those who speak in favour of a bridge refer 
to the Ørestad, and those who are positive to 
the Ørestad plan refer to the bridge. There 
have all the time been these peculiar expla-
nations, which kept an opposition from taking 
shape (Interview with Knud Vilby). 
 
The report was published in March 1991 with 
two minority statements, in which members 
from the City Government expressed their 
unwillingness to take responsibility for the 
Ørestad plan. They claimed that it had first 
been informed by the media, and by the se-
cretariat only four weeks before publication. 
Two days later the prime minister published 
an article in the daily newspaper, Politiken, in 
which he proclaimed that ”It’s now time to act, 
Copenhagen” (Schlüter, 1991). 
 
Less than two months later, in May 1991 
the a Bill on on the Ørestad was intro-
duced to the Parliament, which according 
to the city’s former planning chief, Arne 
Gaardmand, violated then current plan-
ning procedures. According to Gaard-
mand there was no provision for public 
hearings, so that public opinion could be 
heard, as was required. And there were 
also no alternatives presented for consid-
eration, something that was also stipu-
lated in the planning laws. Other plan-
ners, both academic and practical, criti-
cized the fact that there had been no pub-
lic debate in the media, or any attempt to 
solicit expert opinion. Among other critics 
at the time was the Danish Society of Ar-
chitects, which published a highly critical 
report (Danske Arkitekters Landsforbund, 
1991). 
 
Everything had been decided in advance (…)
Both bridges [across the Great Belt and 
across the Øresund] and the Ørestad were 
decided upon behind closed doors. There 
were no real public hearings, debate or alter-
natives. These plans were drawn up by less 
than 10 leading bureaucrats and politicians 
from both sides in the parliament. There was 
never openness and transparency in their 
analyses, reports and explanations, for exam-
ple why they chose a Metro. All the resolu-
tions about debate and public hearing periods 
in the Planning Act, were never maintained, 
even though the [Social Democratic] Minister 
of Finance [in the 1990s] Mogens Lykketoft 
and other top politicians claimed that it was 
the most democratic decision ever made 
about a big project, because nothing is more 
democratic than Parliament.  
 
My argument against this was that the Plan-
ning Act also applies in big infrastructure pro-
jects. The Ørestad is not a single example. 
There are lots of other projects undertaken in 
the 1980s and 1990s (…) where you can see 
the same pattern. I think the politicians don’t 
want the quarrels with the citizens, and in-
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stead they let the professionals and entrepre-
neurs take over; these things are seen to be 
much too complicated for ordinary human be-
ings (Interview with Arne Gaardmand). 
 
The Ørestad Law was passed in June 1992. 
In the first proposal the fixed connection to 
Sweden was combined with the Ørestad pro-
ject, but some of the Social Democratic Mem-
bers of Parliament were not convinced about 
the projects – especially not the Ørestad pro-
ject. The Liberal Party – in government to-
gether with the Conservatives - was unwilling 
to allocate new economic resources to the 
troubled and debt burdened Social Democ-
ratic led Copenhagen City Government. The 
secretariat in the Würtzen Committee had 
offered a win-win solution that would rede-
velop Copenhagen without direct costs for the 
state. The Ørestad Development Company 
(ØDC) could sell the land at market prices. 
The revenues from the sale of attractive land 
in the Ørestad, due to highly developed infra-
structure - comprising a light-rail system - 
would be used to build the light-rail trail. Later 
on, the revenues from the light-rail could pay 
back the credits.  
 
The crucial commitment from the Social De-
mocrats for the Law was first ensured at the 
last moment. In April 1992 Svend Auken was 
deposed as party leader by right wing mem-
bers in the party, with vice-chairman Poul 
Nyrup Rasmussen becoming the new leader. 
Many members, especially in the Copenha-
gen region, were sceptical to the new party 
leader and also sceptical to the Ørestad plan, 
while the mayor who had supported Auken, 
was, as we have seen, quite interested in the 
Ørestad.  
 
When the mayor, Kramer Mikkelsen for the 
first time met the new chairman, he told the 
three leading Social Democrats present that 
the city needed money, that unemployment 
was high and that something needed to be 
done. He forcefully argued that the Ørestad 
plan be put into action. Hence Poul Nyrop 
committed himself to the plans about estab-
lishing a common Ørestad Development 
Company (ØDC) between the state and the 
municipal governments. The mayor remem-
bers in a newspaper article in 2002 this spe-
cial evening where the six persons afterwards 
went out to celebrate:  
 
This is so big ... This is going to be the kick 
that sends Copenhagen into the future ... This 
decision is in a category of its own - at a level 
where history is written (Fall Nielsen, 2002). 
 
As the Amager resident and future Social De-
mocratic Minister of the interior, Karen Jes-
persen said: 
 
The government [Conservativs and Liberals) 
got the Ørestad and we got the collective 
transportation [the Metro] (Abild, 2002). 
 
The Copenhagen City Government (owners 
of 55 per cent of the company) and the Dan-
ish state (45 per cent) set up the Ørestad De-
velopment Cooperation (ØDC) in March 
1993. The company was founded on the law 
from June 1992, where the Social Democ-
ratic, Liberal and Conservative parties voted 
for the proposal in a left-right coalition that 
was opposed by some of the smaller parties, 
such as the Christian Democrats and the so-
cialists. 
 
The economy in stage one was (in 2001 
prices) 6.3 billion DKK (10.8 billion for all 
three stages). The ØDC finance stage one, 
and the pay back time was estimated to 25 –
30 years. 
 
The two main tasks for the ØDC were: 
• To develop and build the Ørestad, a new 
part of Copenhagen, on land on Amager  
• To build and operate a new light-rail sys-
tem in Copenhagen  
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The rail system should be built in three 
stages. This case study is only concerned 
with the first stage, the rail system from Nør-
report in the middle of Copenhagen to the 
Ørestad (South western part of Amager) and 
to a station in the Northeastern part of Am-
ager (Lergravsparken). Stage 1 was officially 
opened in October 2002 two years behind 
schedule. 
 
The Board of Directors in the ØDC has 6 
members; 3 selected by the Ministry of Traffic 
and 3 from the CopenhagenCity Government. 
The ØDC should sell 75.000 square metres a 
year to investors, and the infrastructure in-
vestments would require an initial outlet of 
some 4 billions DKK.  
 
The implementation  
process 
 
The tragedy of the commons 
 
One problem related to public accountability 
that emerged in relation to the implementa-
tion of the project concerned a piece of land 
that had interest for conservationists. The 
Danish Society for the Conservation of Na-
ture (Danmarks Naturfredningsforening: DN) 
and the Copenhagen City Council in 1987 
had made an agreement about the preserva-
tion of Amager Commons, (Amager Fælled), 
an area of West Amager where a part of the 
Ørestad was to be built. DN had up till 1987 
tried to get Amager Commons (Amager 
Fælled) included in the general nature preser-
vation regulations, but the authorities claimed 
that it would be difficult.  
 
They said that they would of course not 
cheat; if we do we’ll damage the reputation of 
the Planning Act as a steering instrument 
(Interview with David Rehling). 
  
DN believed in the authorities’ guarantees, 
printed in the Regional Plan of 1989, that Am-
ager Commons was to be characterized as 
an area for park and recreation use with con-
servation to sustain lake- and marshland ar-
eas. DN perceived it as a de facto preserva-
tion. However, as David Rehling, former di-
rector, recounted for us in an interview, other 
civil servants from the City Government and 
the state were in the Würtzen Committee, at 
the same time planning to build on West Am-
ager.  
 
He was contacted in February 1991 and told 
about the secret Ørestad plan from a highly-
placed friend in the central administration. 
Rehling called the journalists who had fol-
lowed the case, and they checked with their 
unofficial sources in the parliament and the 
government, but nobody had heard anything. 
Only one journalist accepted to cover the 
story, in the newspaper Politiken. After one 
month, where the Minister of Finance, Hen-
ning Dyremose in a television programme, 
together with Rehling, denied that the authori-
ties planned to build on Amager, DN wrote a 
letter to the prime minister: 
 
In the eighty-year history of DN, we have 
never before experienced such broken prom-
ises. It is not acceptable to nature or to the 
Danish population. In a speech the other day 
the Prime Minister said that; “The democracy 
will die in lack of confidence, if there’s no har-
mony between the decision-makers on one 
side and the populations’ attitudes on the 
other”. In DN we find it difficult to believe that 
the authorities actually will break such a 
promise (The letter was given to us during the 
interview with David Rehling). 
 
The prime minister wrote back a few days 
later telling that: “he had first read about the 
plans in the newspaper”. 
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After this DN, and other non-governmental 
organizations, made a formal complaint about 
the conservation of Amager Commons. Ac-
cording to Rehling, the authorities tried to per-
suade the Conservation Council to reject the 
case, but on June 18, 1992 the Board unani-
mously voted to preserve Amager Commons 
from exploitation.  
 
But Amager Commons had only status as a 
conservation area for 18 hours. When on 
June 19, the Liberal, Conservative and Social 
Democrats in Parliament voted in support of 
the law proposal on the Ørestad, with a new 
decision where: “all not yet decided (pending) 
conservation cases are rejected”. Hence the 
authorities made a pro forma appeal to the 
Conservation Council. 
 
Afterwards DN had a seat in the Ørestad 
Committee, in order to offer advice the ØDC 
in architecture and nature conservation ques-
tions, but as the former director tells in 2003: 
 
It was a part of a show to make it look de-
mocratic. The Ørestad has been a dividing 
mark. Before that time it was unthinkable that 
the authorities could violate Laws in such a 
blatant way. Ever since (laughs) it has only 
become worse. There have of course always 
been secret deals, but since 1991 I believe 
that we can talk about ‘brutal parliamenta-
rism’. It means that there is no longer an at-
tempt to involve the public, and that is totally 
against the EU commitments when it comes 
to environmental assessment of plans, pro-
jects and programmes (Interview with David 
Rehling). 
 
When the four winning proposals for the 
Ørestad were chosen in November 1994, 
models for the proposals were presented in a 
meeting hall on Amager in January and Feb-
ruary 1995. Two citizen meetings were held. 
They lasted approximately 5½ hours and 35 
persons asked questions. 
Anne-Grethe Foss wanted opinions on the 
four winning proposals, but most people 
asked why the Metro was placed in the pe-
riphery of Amager where nobody lived. The 
director answered that it could be discussed 
but not changed. Others had taken these de-
cisions. Many wondered about the missing 
information and the secrecy, by which every-
thing was planned in advance (Interview with 
Arne Gaardmand). 
 
The choice of technical solution 
 
Why the Minister of Finance chose a Mini-
metro, as in the French city Lille, is not clear. 
 
In 1994 the rail system best suited to Copen-
hagen was to be selected. Of three different 
systems – trams, light-rail and Metro – the 
ØDC selected, in accordance with the con-
sultant report (from Carl Bro) the Metro. Ac-
cording to the report the Metro would be the 
most environmentally friendly, the most eco-
nomic, and be able to carry the highest num-
ber of passengers and have the fewest acci-
dents.  
 
The Metro is driverless, and is based on fully 
automatically ATC. This means that the Metro 
is able to be very punctual – at least 98 per 
cent of departures will be on time. The Metro 
is supposed to carry 250.000 persons in 24 
hours when all the stages are completed in 
2006.  
 
According to critics Carl Bro was told to rec-
ommend the technologically advanced Metro 
solution. When the secret consultant report, 
choosing the Metro, was uncovered, it was 
realised that the competing tram solution that 
was discussed in the report was an old fash-
ioned variant (Interview with Per Henriksen). 
 
I still don’t understand why they chose the 
Metro, the most difficult solution (Interview 
with David Rehling). 
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According to Per Henriksen, employed at the 
SF (Socialist Party) secretariat in the Parlia-
ment, the ØDC had already chosen the Metro 
because the technically advanced solution 
“would be the best signal to send to potential 
future companies in the Ørestad”: 
  
ØDC was to consider the technical solutions. 
But at the same time they chose to outsource 
very much. I believe that COWI, Carl Bro and 
other consultants, have received fees for 
some 1 billions DKK. In this manner they had 
at the same time secured that the experts in 
Denmark were dependent on further work 
from the ØDC (Interview with Per Henriksen). 
 
The ØDC chose the driverless Metro. The 
basis for this choice was unknown for the 
public. The secret advisory report was only 
published 3 years after the decision was 
made. In Per Henriksen’s opinion the argu-
ments for rejecting trams and light-rail were 
not convincing. There are good experiences 
with trams in France, the Netherlands and 
Sweden. In France the Ministry of Traffic rec-
ommended in 1975 that all the big cities 
should develop trams instead of building met-
ros, because of the huge investments re-
quired. 
 
In the Parliament some members were scep-
tical of the technically advanced and expen-
sive solution. That meant that the final choice 
of equipment supplier in 1996 became criti-
cal. The ØDC had to choose between Sie-
mens and Ansaldo. Siemens’ tender, as dis-
closed later, was approximately 500 million 
more expensive, but was supposedly of a 
better quality and Ansaldo had never before 
tried to build a Metro. 
 
The consultant engineers (COWI) paid atten-
tion to this in the confidential report, which 
later was disclosed in the press. Central in 
this was the ATC system (Automatic Train 
Control), security, as, according to COWI, 
would cause Ansaldo problems. ATC is to 
secure that the driverless Metro runs and 
stops properly. COWI argued that the 
Ansaldo proposal would involve a greater risk 
and therefore increased expenditures. 
 
COWI was also asked to assess the eco-
nomic consequences of a delay of the pro-
ject, and in COWI’s opinion the conse-
quences were substantial. The consultants 
determined that Ansaldo would delay the pro-
ject by approximately 27 months, with extra 
costs of over 1 billion DKK. Siemens was ex-
pected to delay approximately 16 months with 
extra costs of 640 million DKK. 
 
In summer 1996 ØDC initiated contract nego-
tiations with Ansaldo, without letting the pub-
lic know about the consultant assessments of 
the two tenders. This first happened a year 
and a half later when a television station in 
February 1998 disclosed the consultant re-
port. The reason why ØDC picked Ansaldo 
might not only have been due to a lower ten-
der.  
 
The reason to choose a component supplier 
that had never tried to build a Metro before 
was probably due to the estimated delay: Ac-
cording to a later – classified – COWI note, 
“The advantage to choose Ansaldo’s bid in-
creased if there were delays in construction.” 
If ØDC had known that the construction com-
pany, COMET, which was carrying out the 
tunnel work in the Copenhagen underground, 
could face a delay, then it wouldn’t make 
such a big difference.  
 
In spring 1999 the board of directors in ØDC 
sent a note telling that COMET’s seriously 
delaying the work would have meant a ten 
times bigger compensation claim if ØDC had 
chosen Siemens instead of Ansaldo, simply 
because Siemens would have come further in 
their work (Dahlin, 2002). 
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COWI’s final conclusions just before the con-
tract assignment, describes Ansaldo’s ATC-
system as of “inferior quality with high risk”, 
but COWI estimates that Ansaldo however 
will be able to deliver a fully automatic driver-
less system.  
 
The contract with Ansaldo was signed in Oc-
tober 1996 in Copenhagen. In spring 1997 
ØDC was called to a meeting in Pittsburgh, 
USA, where the subsidiary company, Union 
Switch & Signal, was going to produce the 
ATC-system for Copenhagen. In a not public 
summary (account) it is told that the It-
platform to the ATC-system had been 
changed.  
 
That means that the system was still under 
development. In the same spring Ansaldo 
tried to get approval for the Metro’s concept 
design, but all documents were rejected. But 
the public was never told, not even the parlia-
mentary reference group had been told. In 
August 1997 the members were informed that 
Ansaldo was delayed some six weeks, but 
director Anne-Grethe Foss added that 
Ansaldo’s delays were decreasing, and that 
the ØDC counted on quickly being able to 
counteract the delay.  
 
In the autumn Ansaldo was approximately 11 
months behind schedule with the develop-
ment of an ATC-system. Nevertheless the 
Minister of Transport, Sonja Mikkelsen wrote 
in December 1998 that Ansaldo was ”more or 
less” following schedule.  
 
Five months later, after receiving a new 
status report, she admits that her confidence 
has been replaced by an equal amount of 
scepticism. Sonja Mikkelsen writes – against 
the advice from the Head of the Traffic De-
partment – a letter, also mailed to the Parlia-
mentary Traffic Committee. Here the Minister 
apologises that:  
 
Ansaldo (...) are clearly behind schedule on 
vital parts, especially when it comes to soft-
ware and documentation, which should form 
the basis for the security approval (...) I am 
the first to apologise that the Parliament (…) 
has been given an unnecessarily positive im-
pression of the status for this part of the 
Metro. (Abild, 2002). 
 
Only one day after the publication of the re-
port there is a change in the ØDC board of 
directors. The head of the planning depart-
ment in the Ministry of Traffic was removed, 
and the new member of the ØDC board was 
not employed in the Ministry of Traffic. As a 
result the responsibility for the project moves 
somewhat further from the Ministry of Traffic, 
which had taken over responsibility from the 
Ministry of Finance in 1996 – 97. Apparently it 
no longer wanted to have close ties to the big 
building project. (Interview with Ulrik Dahlin). 
 
Public accountability 
issues  
 
Openness 
 
Ulrik Dahlin, a journalist who has followed the 
project from the outset, has continually em-
phasized the fact that the decision to build the 
Metro and the Ørestad were made behind 
closed doors:  
 
The ØDC construction reminds of many other 
construction projects which the leading politi-
cal parties have settled through many years. 
Behind closed doors they make a political 
settlement. It’s not at all unusual; such a pro-
ject is organised in a semi-private company, 
which means that it will not hit the minister if 
something goes wrong. It’s the same with the 
airport, Post Denmark and the Danish State 
Rail and in many other cases. (Interview with 
Ulrik Dahlin). 
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The planning laws call for more openness, 
but in the ØDC the public is refused admis-
sion, for business reasons. This was suppos-
edly changed in 1996, when the company 
claimed to follow the planning laws, but when 
the journalist Ulrik Dahlin claimed right-of-
access to documents both in the Copenha-
gen City Government and the ØDC he found 
big differences; he received much more infor-
mation from the city than from the company. 
 
But it’s the same as with other big compa-
nies; they are open in the way they want to 
be. That’s quite normal. (Interview with Ulrik 
Dahlin). 
 
At two public meetings in 1995 the ØDC’s 
director Anne-Grethe Foss, said, as men-
tioned earlier, that the decision about the 
Ørestad and the Metro could be discussed, 
but not changed. Many have criticized the 
lack of public consultation in the projects. The 
retired planning director, Arne Gaardmand, 
says that the ØDC followed the letter in the 
planning law but not the intentions (Interview 
with Arne Gaardmand).  
 
By this he means that there were instituted 
certain formal procedures of accountability, 
but that there was almost no effort to develop 
ways of involving concerned citizens into the 
planning and implementation of the project.  
 
There has certainly been a lack of public con-
sultation and discussion with those living in 
the area where the project is being con-
structed. As Palle Kummerfeldt, spokesper-
son for the Amager Metro Group (AMG) told 
us in an interview: 
 
I think that many people on Amager feels that 
things have been going on over our heads, 
where everything was dealt with in advance. 
My impression is that the citizen involvement 
was just a show. (Interview with Palle Kum-
merfeld). 
Many citizens apparently gave up in advance. 
When AMG was created there were approxi-
mately 120 members, but by early 2003, 
there were only a handful active in AMG.  
 
As Kummerfeldt explains: 
 
The problem with [mayor] Kramer Mikkelsen 
is that he’s wearing too many hats in this 
case. He is Lord Mayor, he has a seat in the 
ØDC board, he’s a member of HUR and he’s 
vice chairman in the East Amager Rail Com-
pany [the company responsible for the sec-
ond stage of the Metro]. He is planner, deci-
sion maker and complaint board all in one. 
(Interview with Palle Kummerfeldt). 
 
Kramer Mikkelsen concluded one week be-
fore the opening of the Metro in October 
2002, that: 
 
The process has not been open enough. We 
have underestimated the public need for influ-
ence, and the forthcoming metro building 
must be more transparent. This is not a critic 
of the Ørestad Development Cooperation, 
because I’m still convinced that the Metro 
building process has been far more open 
than other big public works projects. But we 
can improve. (Dahlin, 2002). 
 
The retired city-planning director, Arne 
Gaardmand, is more concerned: 
 
This new kind of corporate planning is a 
threat to our democracy. In corporate exer-
cise of power, as seen in the 1990s big infra-
structure projects, more influence is given to 
leading politicians, commercial and profes-
sional groups, behind closed doors where 
public hearings and debate become ritualistic 
excuses. (Interview with Arne Gaardmand). 
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Cost-accounting  
 
The budget in the ØDC has since the begin-
ning increased four fold. The initial outlay was 
tobe paid back from selling land. The period 
for the payback of credits has been prolonged 
from some 11 years to 20 – 22 years (2020), 
and that makes the project potentially more 
vulnerable to fluctuations in the interest rate. 
Recent figures show that the credit limit has 
been reached and that an additional 145 mil-
lion Euro has been added to the total credit 
limit.  
 
According to Palle Kummefeldt from the AMG 
group, a retired economist, the operation of 
the Metro will not be profitable: the ØDC has 
‘forgotten’ to include costs of depreciation in 
their accounts. That means a deficit of ap-
proximately 100 – 200 millions DKK every 
year when all three stages are completed. 
 
The National Audit Office published a critical 
report on the ØDC in 2000: 
 
The ØDC has not provided adequate control 
nor proper management information about 
the project’s progress. This had a big influ-
ence on the Metro projects delay and cost 
escalations. 
 
Like many similar projects, the Ørestad/Metro 
project has seen its budget increase substan-
tially in the course of implementation, by 
some 5,6 billion DKK, and there has also 
been a delay of 2 years in completing the first 
stage of the Metro. This is also due to a lack 
of accountability; that, according to critics like 
the Danish planning professor Bent Flyvbjerg, 
too few people are involved in the manage-
ment of the project.  
 
He and his colleagues have investigated 258 
large public infrastructure projects, or 
megaprojects, representing different regions 
and historical periods worldwide. In 9 out of 
10 transportation infrastructure projects, costs 
are underestimated. There is, as they put it, a 
“calamitous history of cost overrun”, accord-
ing to which the costs of such megaprojects 
are systematically underestimated. Underesti-
mation cannot be explained by errors and is 
best explained by strategic misrepresenta-
tion, usually for political purposes. The meth-
ods of cost estimation that are used in most 
mega-projects are simply not based on 
proper accounting methods (Flyvbjerg, 2003). 
 
Benefits 
 
The traffic situation has for decades been a 
major problem for Amager. The Würtzen Re-
port claimed that the Metro would approve 
the traffic situation on Amager. 
 
On Amager we don’t need growth – we al-
ready have problems with the existing traffic. 
(...) The Ørestad will attract more traffic. Al-
though they make some traffic investments, 
they leave others behind. The car traffic will 
increase, and the problems for the current 
inhabitants will grow worse. (Interview with 
Knud Vilby). 
 
The local newspaper Amager Bladet (weekly) 
has since the Metro opening in October 2002 
been full of angry letters to the editor, where it 
is described how much more time people 
spent every day in the traffic. The old bus 
lines have been eliminated and replaced by 
other busses going to the Metro on the west-
ern part of the island. More than 1500 local 
citizens on Amager have complained to HUR 
since the opening of the Metro. As a re-
sponse HUR has set in more busses. 
 
Although ØDC claims that the Metro will be 
neutral in terms of traffic figures compared to 
earlier many of those expressing their opinion 
in letters to the editor of the local paper do 
not agree. The Ørestad is still far from fin-
ished, and the citizens on Amager will from 
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now on have to be transported across the is-
land in order to fill up the Metro.  
 
The Metro has only been realised to capital-
ise on the Ørestad. On Amager the Metro is 
called the “stage coach across the prairie” 
because the Ørestad is still unspoiled nature. 
(Interview with Knud Vilby). 
 
Due to a lack of investors a big shopping cen-
tre has been constructed (the Fields Centre). 
This was allowed under the former Social De-
mocratic Government, when the Minister of 
the Environment made an exception from the 
rules. The construction of such a large shop-
ping centre had previously been forbidden. 
According to Vilby, there is a risk that the 
Fields Centre will lead to the closing of many 
local shops on the main street, as well as in 
the inner city. The Fields Center expects cus-
tomers from as far away as Jutland to the 
west (ca. 250 km) and from Sweden in the 
east, and it will presumably increase car traf-
fic significantly. 
 
In 2001 the ØDC should have sold 315.000 
square meters to private investors. The ØDC 
have sold 471.000, but only approximately 
176.000 to private investors. Of these 
176.000 the Fields Centre bought 146.000 
square meters. 
 
In Knud Vilby’s opinion the Ørestad plan is an 
expression of a blind faith in growth. Business 
people and politicians believe that the two big 
bridges (as well as a third bridge that is in the 
works to Germany) along with the Ørestad 
will ensure prosperity for Copenhagen. But 
there are no examples in history, in Denmark 
or anywhere else, that bridges and highways 
bring about growth and economic develop-
ment by themselves. 
 
For the “Growth Coalition” half way through 
the implementation phase of the Ørestad/
Metro, the point of no return has been passed 
a long time ago. Land in the Ørestad is not 
being sold fast enough and as a result the 
ØDC cannot provide the needed funds for the 
Metro project. In addition the costs of the 
Metro were greater than anticipated. It would 
retrospectively perhaps have been cheaper to 
construct the Metro with public funds partly 
subsidised with revenue from the selling of 
land.  
 
The changes of investments and credits high-
light the project’s economic vulnerability. The 
plans were based on assumptions that were 
more political than practical in nature 
(Andersen, 1999). The ØDC construction has 
cost a lot, also in terms of public and political 
legitimacy. 
 
The Metro/Ørestad in the media 
 
As mentioned in the initial profile, newspa-
pers in Denmark are highly politicized, with 
Jyllandsposten standing quite close to the 
Liberal Party, Berlingske Tidende being 
closely aligned to the Conservative Party, and 
Politiken generally supporting the Social De-
mocrtaic Party.  
 
This means that it has been problematic to 
criticize a big project that has been supported 
by all the large parties. It is really only the in-
dependent, left-wing newspaper, Information, 
which has provided much in the way of critical 
coverage of the project.  
 
The Ørestad project was first presented in 
public in Politiken in March 1991, reporting 
that the mayor, Kramer Mikkelsen was trying 
to put pressure on the party leader, Svend 
Auken, who was sceptical about a quick deci-
sion due to reluctance in the party.  
 
An article in Jyllandposten in April 1991 said 
that the Conservative Minister of Finance, 
Henning Dyremose would summon the Par-
liament to an extra session in August to 
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achieve broad political support for three major 
projects: a fixed connection to Sweden, the 
Ørestad and a conversion of the Copenhagen 
harbour. 
 
Typical examples from the first year is as fol-
low: 
(...) this new part of Copenhagen will create 
thousands of working places and more indus-
try in the capital. (...) In the Government’s law 
proposal are the traffic investments estimated 
to approximately 3.9 billions DDK. (Jyllands-
posten, May 7, 1991). 
 
The Ørestad project will become a growth 
factor to a crisis-stricken capital. The project 
will result in 60.000 new working places over 
the coming 30 years. (Jyllandsposten, May 
30, 1991). 
 
Most of the articles in these years are dealing 
with the growth perspective. This is due to a 
broad consensus that something needs to be 
done for the capital. There were only few writ-
ing in the first three or four years from a more 
critical perspective: A local citizen meeting on 
Amager in the beginning of 1995, arranged 
by the ØDC, was only briefly discussed under 
the headline: “The Ørestad director in harsh 
headwind”: 
 
And in the article: 
Director Anne-Grethe Foss tried unsuccess-
fully to convince the citizens that the ØDC all 
ready once had heard the public and 
changed a law proposal (…) Many didn’t be-
lieve her, but said that earlier investigations 
had proved opposite. The citizens talked 
about manipulation. (…) The citizens were 
not satisfied with the fact that the Ørestad 
was placed on earlier beach area (...) The 
answer from the director was that the building 
was allowed on the earlier beach areas, 
which had never been a area for conservation 
(…) (Berlingske Tidende, January 26, 1995). 
 
From 1996 to the opening in 2002 all four 
newspapers publish more critical articles. But 
usually not from a ‘public participation’ or 
‘citizen involvement’ perspective: The first 
editorials appear in late 1998.  
 
Most critical was Information, which in the 
leading article ”What is it we want with the 
capital?” writes: 
 
Investors are not certain where the authorities 
want to locate the development (…) is it in the 
harbour? in “Holmen”? (…)or in the Ørestad, 
where there is constructed a Metro as the 
only selling point, and nothing else? In the 
middle of the political quarrels about interna-
tional competition with Hamburg, Stockholm 
and only God knows where, there is some-
thing ironic in the fact that we are mostly 
competing with ourselves in a random and 
failed development. (Information, December 
9, 1998). 
  
In an editorial in January 1999 the Ørestad 
project was discussed, after the chairman in 
the Parliamentary Finance Committee, Peter 
Duetoft (from the small Christian Democratic 
Party), the day before had claimed that: ”(…) 
there is more and more in the Ørestad case 
that is problematic”.  
 
The leading article is dealing with the Ørestad 
project as a case closely related to the Dan-
ish ’province trauma’ or ‘the majority of parlia-
mentary members from Jutland’. The Ørestad 
project is explained as a ’clever’ solution: 
 
Fraud was the name. (…) and it also meant 
that the authorities ran away from promise, 
they had been giving in this specific area on 
West Amager. (Information January 21, 
1999). 
 
Politiken writes editorially, much in the same 
vein, that it is excellent that the parliament 
now asks the National Audit Office to deal 
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with the financing model in the Ørestad pro-
ject. Even so Politiken is much more sympa-
thetoic to the project; the Ørestad is called; 
 
the most explicit initiative for the future that 
has been made in several decades – not just 
in Copenhagen, but in the whole country. 
(Politiken, January 24, 1999).  
 
Like Politiken most of the newspapers praise 
the growth aspects in the Ørestad/Metro pro-
ject. 
 
The editorial in Information on May 24 2000 
criticises under the headline ”The Minister’s 
exception”, the Minister of the Environment, 
Svend Auken (S) for allowing the construction 
of a new Mega shopping centre (Fields) in the 
Ørestad. Until this exemption there was no 
possibility to build shopping centre outside 
the cities in Denmark.  
 
This rule by decree is due to a reference to; 
“It is important to stop the shop closures. It is 
important for the urban environment, we must 
make sure that we have living cities. So that 
Denmark is not only for car drivers, we must 
protect our old shopping streets”. The edito-
rial also reminds the readers that Auken be-
fore the parliamentary election in 1998 had 
said: 
 
It’s very difficult for me to see that it should be 
possible to build a large shopping centre in 
the Ørestad, if we are still in government after 
the election. (Information, May 24, 2000). 
 
The Social Democratic Government coalition 
won the election, and a year and a half later 
the exception was made. The editorial ex-
presses the fear that the Fields Centre will 
draw costumers from the inner city and from 
the local shopping streets. It is the ’crazy’ fi-
nancing model (in the Ørestad project) that is 
to blame: 
 
To pay for the Metro, which is supposed to 
strengthen public transportation, the Minister 
is forced to give an exception to the Fields 
Centre, which will lead to increased numbers 
of car drivers. Hence: the Metro is paid, but 
who’s gonna ride in it? (…)When the Bill from 
1991 was passed no one knew that the 
Ørestad should be used to build a mega cen-
tre. No, no we were told that it should house 
the future high technology, knowledge-
intensive companies and biotechnology (…) 
The mayors in the rest of Denmark, who were 
not allowed to build new shopping centres 
must be following the Ørestad project very 
closely. (Information, May 24, 2000). 
 
A year later Information published an even 
more sarcastic editorial: 
 
Should we laugh or cry? (…) the Ørestad pro-
ject would be so comical, if only it weren’t so 
deeply tragic…The reason for this is that the 
environmental court by a vote of 7 to 3 has 
decided that the Fields centre is illegal, but 
(…)not so illegal that it must be stopped?! All 
ten members agreed that it was illegal, but 
only three felt that it would have negative en-
vironmental consequences (Information, Feb-
ruary 14, 2001). 
 
Two weeks before the opening in October 
2002, an editorial in Politiken proclaims: ”We 
can’t wait”. The article is very positive: “better 
late than never”, ”we look forward to exciting 
experiences” and ”beautiful Italian trains”. In 
the second part of the article there are some 
critical comments on the financial part of the 
project (Politiken, October 2, 2002).  
 
As in other leading articles it is clear that pub-
lic accountability aspects are marginal, al-
most not existing with the exception of Infor-
mation – an exception, as the expression 
goes, that proves the rule.  
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On the opening day, Jyllandsposten writes 
that; “with the Metro (…) we have an obvious 
reason to celebrate Copenhagen”. 
 
This is a strategic investment (…) which will 
contribute to giving Copenhagen a more in-
ternational status, which is needed if it’s go-
ing to be a metropolis. It is a milestone in in-
frastructural terms (…) and will only increase 
the optimism and economic growth our capi-
tal has experienced in the last couple of 
years. (Jyllandsposten, October 19, 2002). 
 
The same day in Information under the head-
line, “Metro politics” there is a more critical 
tone: 
 
(…) public investment was not in sight (…) 
and the Members of Parliament from Jutland 
were eager to get money to another Jutland 
highway. (…) That was the real background 
for the secret Ørestad/Metro plan”.  
 
The land sale on West Amager should, ac-
cording to the leading article, cover the ex-
penses of the Metro. This is called ‘Magic 
Metro Politics’ (Information, October 19, 
2002). 
 
Berlingske Tidende writes in the leading arti-
cle – under the headline ”Congratulations”, 
that; ”The metro is going to be a success” 
and ”(…) incomprehensible that the capital 
has been able to do without a Metro for so 
many years”. The editorial, however, finds it 
deplorable that the building project was de-
layed two years and the costs increased so 
much (Berlingske Tidende, October 19, 
2002). 
 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The Metro/Ørestad project is an example of 
accountability behind closed doors. Shaped 
by a consensual policy “regime” with deep 
roots in the Danish political culture, it was dif-
ficult for the public to be involved in the for-
mulation or implementation of the project. 
The lack of openness and consultation with 
the public and with those who are most af-
fected by the project – the inhabitants of West 
Amager – well illustrate the modus operandi 
of the consensual regime.  
 
What is intriguing about the case is how diffi-
cult it has been to institute other procedures 
of accountability. Neither the interests in envi-
ronmentalism that characterized the period of 
implementation – what we have termed the 
“green accountability regime” in the initial pro-
file, nor the more recent interest in cost-
benefit analysis and cost-accounting that is 
characteristic of the new Liberal Government, 
have been utilized, in any significant degree, 
to the Metro/Ørestad. Due to the political and 
perceived economic importance of the pro-
ject, it has simply been impossible for the 
public to mobilize what might be termed an 
accountability capacity. There have been no 
appropriate contexts that have developed, no 
sites of debate or critique, no hybrid forums 
where critical voices could present their opin-
ions. There have been a few highly circum-
scribed hearings, and occasional articles in 
the officially sanctioned critical newspaper, 
Information, but a broad public discussion 
has been conspicuous for its absence. 
 
In the end, we are perhaps left to conclude 
that mega-projects such as the Metro/
Ørestad are unable to be accounted for in a 
meaningful way without some kind of funda-
mental change in the political culture, or, for 
that matter, in the Danish mentality. People 
know what they could, and even should do, 
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but for some deep-seated reasons, they sim-
ply haven’t done those things. They have 
chosen not to try very hard to make their au-
thorities accountable for the decisions they 
have made. 
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Summary 
 
The case study deals with public accountabil-
ity issues connected to household waste 
management in the municipality of Copenha-
gen. In relation to what we have previously 
termed the “green accountability regime” of 
the 1990s, the case study focuses on two lo-
cal experiments with recycling of household 
waste. These can be seen as examples of 
green accountability in action in the sense 
that efforts have been made to involve the 
local population in the project, as well as fol-
low principles of “sustainable development” 
by integrating an environmental concern into 
the procedures of waste management. 
 
The study presents some of the principles of 
waste management in Denmark, as well as 
the historical development of the projects. 
 
Public accountability issues in this case pri-
marily deal with the processes of participa-
tion, and what might be termed the cultural 
dynamics of participation in the two projects. 
 
Background 
 
In Denmark some 13 millions tons of waste 
(2000) are produced every year, of which ap-
proximately 22% is domestic, or household 
waste. A large part of the generated waste is 
used for heat and electricity production, with 
a relatively small percentage going to landfill. 
In keeping with the decentralized character of 
environmental management and policy-
making, the main responsibility for waste 
management lies in Denmark with municipal, 
or local authorities.  
 
The central government, through the Ministry 
of the Environment, sets the overall 
"framework" conditions for waste manage-
ment, while implementation rests almost en-
tirely with local governmental authorities (The 
Ministry of the Environment 2001).  
 
Waste management was, in the 1990s, one 
of the areas that was central to what we have 
termed in the initial profile the "green ac-
countability regime.” In the 1990s, public ac-
countability procedures - and public policy 
making in general - came to be explicitly re-
lated to the quest for sustainable develop-
ment, both in doctrinal and practical terms. 
Characteristic features of the green account-
ability regime were the institutionalisation of 
processes of public participation and stake-
holder involvement, and an emphasis on pre-
vention rather than control in relation to spe-
cific areas of environmental policy and deci-
sion-making.  
 
A new national waste management plan - 
Waste 21 – became law in early 1999. Waste 
21 (the Ministry of the Environment and En-
ergy 1999) prescribed new initiatives in order 
to facilitate a more efficient waste manage-
ment, especially in regard to source separa-
tion. Waste 21 introduced a change of focus 
in Danish waste management. Focus had 
previously been on quantitative objectives, 
i.e. waste minimisation and increased recy-
cling. From Waste 21 focus should also be on 
qualitative objectives, in order to reduce envi-
ronmental impact and increase resource utili-
sation in an economically effective manner. 
Waste management 
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The plan also emphasized the importance of 
involving business enterprises and local citi-
zens in the management solutions. The plan 
underpins that also in the future, municipal 
governments will be responsible for the de-
velopment of new management solutions, in 
order to make them flexible and appropriate 
to local and regional conditions. It is crucial 
that waste management solutions be based 
on the so-called waste hierarchy, meaning 
that recycling has a higher priority than incin-
eration and land filling.  
 
Waste 21 identified the following challenges 
as being the most important:  
i. to reduce environmental impact from con-
taminants, and  
ii. to ensure better resource recovery.  
 
According to the general doctrine of sustain-
able development, the main area of effort is 
to separate waste more effectively. The differ-
ent types, or components, of waste should be 
treated separately, insofar that it is economi-
cally possible and environmentally beneficial. 
This will increase recycling and decrease the 
problems caused by environmental contami-
nants. The plan calls for a broader public par-
ticipation of citizens and enterprises in waste 
solutions, in which prevention is one of the 
key elements. 
 
The following eight types, or components, 
should be separated at the source: 
• Organic waste  
• Paper and cardboard  
• Cardboard packaging  
• PVC  
• Impregnated wood  
• Waste electrical and electronic equipment  
• End-of-life vehicles  
• Batteries 
 
The Danish waste management model, which 
is presented in the Waste 21, is meant to be 
a comprehensive system covering waste pre-
vention, collection and treatment. It is based 
on a combination of traditional administrative 
instruments, and various other instruments 
such as taxes and charges, subsidy schemes 
and agreements. The waste tax is differenti-
ated so that it is most expensive to landfill 
waste, cheaper to incinerate it, and tax ex-
empt to recycle.  
 
Every four years, the local authorities must 
prepare a short-term waste management plan 
covering four years, and a long-term plan 
covering 12 years. The Danish waste model 
is the result of a close interplay between EU 
regulation and national regulation. The EU 
waste regulation policy forms the background 
for waste management in Denmark. In one 
respect Denmark differs from the other Euro-
pean countries in that incineration is much 
more predominant than landfill. The funda-
mental principle of the model is that waste 
management is a public sector task, thus the 
local authorities or city councils are responsi-
ble for the management of all waste in Den-
mark. 
 
The established public collection systems 
with source separation enjoy widespread 
public acceptance. It is a municipal task to 
ensure that the waste hierarchy is followed, 
and to solve the waste problem at the source 
by introducing cleaner technology, environ-
mental management, green accounting and 
similar concepts. As such, waste should not 
only be perceived as an environmental prob-
lem, but also as a resource and source of 
economic activity (The Ministry of Environ-
ment and Energy 1999 p.40). 
 
Recycling of domestic waste is meant to be 
increased considerably. In 1997 there was a 
recycling rate of 15 per cent. The objective in 
year 2004 is 30 per cent recycling and 70 per 
cent incineration of domestic waste. Focus 
will be put on increased separation and col-
lection of glass, paper, plastic and the organic 
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fraction of domestic waste. These four waste 
types cover around 84 per cent of total waste 
amounts. 
 
Visitors and planners from other countries 
often ask how we get people to separate the 
waste. Maybe it’s because the Danish popu-
lation is so well educated and enlightened. 
Compared to other countries we are far 
ahead. (Interview with Merete Kristoffersen). 
 
The national targets for reuse, incineration 
and land fill in 2004 are 64 per cent reuse, 24 
per cent incineration and 12 per cent land fill. 
 
In a report from the Ministry of Environment 
and Energy to the Parliament in May 2002, it 
is proposed that be considerably more reuse, 
more incineration and less land filling to reach 
the targets in 2004 (the Environmental Board 
2002). 
 
Of approximately 13.000.000 tons of waste in 
2000, 8.461.000 tons were reused, that is 65 
per cent of the total amounts. This is a rise on 
646.000 tons compared to 1999. The total 
amount of waste incinerated in 2000 was 
3.064.000 tons. That is an increase of 
135.000 tons, but the share to incineration is 
unchanged at 24 per cent. The amounts of 
land filling were in 2000 1.489.000 tons, 
which is an increase of 17.000 tons com-
pared to 1999. Proportionately land fill repre-
sents 11 per cent of the total amounts. 
 
The overall target (for 2004) in Waste 21 was 
almost reached in 1999. Year 2000 has 
showed a further shifting between the treat-
ments, hence the share going to reuse is 1 
per cent higher compared to the target for 
2004.  
 
 
 
Waste management 
in Copenhagen 
 
In January 1999 491.082 people lived in the 
municipality of Copenhagen, which is 9,3 per 
cent of the whole Danish population. From 
1994 there has been a population growth of 
5.1 per cent, and it is expected to increase 
another 6,4 per cent from 1999 to 2012. In 
1999 there were a total of 279.300 dwellings 
(homes) in Copenhagen, and there were 
321.000 workplaces in the municipality with a 
growth rate at 1 per cent every year. It is es-
pecially in relation to IT, biotechnology, con-
sultants and public administration that there 
has been a growth rate. Almost 170.000 of 
those who work in Copenhagen live outside 
the municipality. 
 
Approximately 21 per cent (1999) of the 
waste in Copenhagen is household waste. 
Waste amounts increased from 1996 to 1999 
with 4 per cent every year. In 1999 every citi-
zen in the capital produced 439 kilo of waste. 
The amounts have slightly increased over ten 
years up to 1996, remained almost stable, 
and been arising again from 1999 (The Mu-
nicipality of Copenhagen 2001). In the mu-
nicipality of Copenhagen the City Council is 
the supreme political authority. It has 55 
members who are elected for a 4-year term. 
The City Council lays down the framework for 
the administration and duties of the seven 
standing Committees. Each of the standing 
committees consists of 11 members, one of 
whom is a Mayor and the Chairperson of the 
Committee.  
 
The Committees normally decide cases 
within their field of responsibility. Overall deci-
sions are, however, still made by the Copen-
hagen City Council. The agendas of the 
meetings are available from the City's librar-
ies, the City Hall Information Centre and be-
fore the meetings in the public gallery of the 
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City Hall. After the meetings, minutes are pre-
pared which are available from libraries and 
on the Internet. The administrative structure 
of the City of Copenhagen is based on the 
one-stop principle so that, as far as possible, 
citizens need only contact one administration 
in each specific case.  
 
The Energy, Water and Environment Commit-
tee is responsible for waste disposal and re-
cycling. In year 2000, when a municipal 
Waste Plan was passed in the City Council, 
the committee's Mayor and Chairman was a 
socialist (Bo Asmus Kjeldgaard), representing 
the Socialist People's Party, which is a party 
to the left of the Social Democratic Party. To 
day, after the election in November 2001, the 
Environmental Mayor is a Social Democrat as 
are three other members of eleven. 
 
It was to a large degree the politicians that 
wanted an increased citizen involvement. 
That has meant that we have implemented 
specific projects, as in Inner Nørrebro and 
Kgs. Enghave, although it is more expensive. 
We have not wanted to take part in a ‘left-
right separation of shoes’ – although maybe 
we have anyway … (Interview with Merete 
Kristoffersen). 
 
The ongoing waste management plan is the 
third waste plan for the Danish capital city. It 
represents a commitment to the EU regula-
tion, “Waste 21” and the Danish waste man-
agement model. The first waste plan in Co-
penhagen was passed in 1990 (“Waste Plan 
1993”) and the second in 1998 (“Waste Plan 
2000”). The two first plans focused on recy-
cling of building and construction waste, and 
by 2000 more than 90 per cent were being 
reused. In 1990 only 10 per cent of building 
waste was reused. 
 
“Waste Plan 2004”, which runs to 2012, high-
lights household waste. The waste flow has 
increased over the last ten years, and this is 
one of the biggest challenges discussed in 
the Plan. According to the Waste Plan the 
increased waste flow calls for innovative 
thinking and cooperation among producers, 
distributors, the parliament and all the con-
sumers. Producers must invent new, so-
called cleaner technologies and citizens must 
separate the waste at the source.  
 
A specific communication plan, to increase 
the dialogue with citizens, is being prepared. 
Communication and dialogue is a special task 
in relation to “Waste Plan 2004”. A top-down 
flow of information is considered insufficient.  
 
In Copenhagen all collection of refuse and 
night soil from the citizens is governed by 
“Waste Disposal Company 1898” (R-98), 
which has been granted the waste conces-
sion. It is a non-profit consumer led, self-
governing institution/company.  
 
The R-98 concession, running to 2020, has 
become the focus of some debate, at a time 
when many public concessions are being 
converted to private companies, or to public-
private partnerships. R-98’s governing au-
thority is made up of consumer representa-
tives, i.e. homeowner organisations, the large 
housing corporations, tenants association, 
members of the City Council in Copenhagen 
and the employees of R-98. The Board con-
sists of 12 members, four for the local au-
thorities and two for the employees. 
  
R-98 is interested in new waste projects, but 
they some times find it hard to work close to-
gether with grass rots: 
 
We had one of them employed at R-98, but it 
was a chock for him that he had to work so 
hard, effectively, register so much etc. He 
stopped. (Interview with Kirsten Henriksen 
2003). 
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According to a local chairman in Inner Nøre-
bro the R-98 company is not particularly sat-
isfied with the Nørrebro waste model al-
though they say something else: 
 
The politicians tells R-98 that they must be 
positive to the Inner Nørrebro project, but 
they are not. It’s too troublesome and it’s too 
expensive. (Interview with Asbjørn Skytte, 
Chairman in the Renters and Owners Board 
in Inner Nørrebro 2003). 
 
Inner Nørrebro and  
Kgs. Enghave 
 
Two different parts of Copenhagen have im-
plemented projects in relation to waste pre-
vention. In Inner Nørrebro and Kgs. Enghave 
have citizens, local businesses and local au-
thorities for some years being separating the 
waste at the source. The Waste project in In-
ner Nørrebro grew out of an urban ecological 
building project (BO 90), which was part of 
the Urban renewal efforts. The waste project 
was, to a large extent, the initiative of local 
citizens. 
 
In Inner Nørrebro it was very much the local 
citizens that started the waste project. It had 
a starting point in our experiences from BO-
90 [a so-called urban ecology project in 
1990]. (Interview with Erik Jørgensen). 
 
The waste project in Kgs. Enghave (meaning: 
the Kings Garden) is an Agenda 21 project 
and a part of an urban renewal project. The 
waste project was implemented and led by R-
98 and partly financed by the Ministry of Envi-
ronment. 
 
Public participation in Kgs. Enghave … yes 
…maybe…It has mostly been ‘information’ …
we had citizen meetings and tenant board 
meetings, but … yes …it has primarily been 
the fact that administrative staff and company 
employees have taken part in the decisions. 
Before I was project leader it was the citizens 
that decided that they wanted a ‘green Kgs. 
Enghave’. In the last three years I’ve been 
working very close together with the tenants 
boards, and they represent the citizens. Citi-
zen involvement can be troublesome; they 
work at another speed and they don’t know 
about how the system works. There are good 
and bad things about public participation, but 
here in Kgs Enghave it’s the professionals [R-
98] who are in charge. (Interview with Anita 
Ringsing). 
 
Inner Nørrebro can be considered more of a 
bottom-up project and Kgs. Enghave is more 
a top down project. They represent different 
strategies in relation to citizen participation 
and public accountability in waste projects. 
 
In Inner Nørrebro the project was initiated 
from below as well as from the authorities. 
The KMEK organisation [NGO] has gone 
through the Mayor, and they have been very 
skilled to push the right buttons; it has not 
been started from us. [the municipal admini-
stration] That means contrary that we have 
many bad experiences, where we have been 
forced to clean up after some failure local 
waste projects. I am not saying that it’s im-
possible when all the responsibility lies in the 
hands of a few local activists, but if one or 
two of them stops or moves to another town, 
everything can easily be dropped on the floor. 
The Inner Nørrebro project has received quite 
a lot of money, and that’s what lifted them up. 
All these projects however make the whole 
system more expensive, and that’s a big 
problem. (Interview with Merete Kristof-
fersen). 
 
The two project areas will briefly be pre-
sented here in order to understand the differ-
ent contexts and experiences. 
 
 Research Report 3 2004 
In November 2001 31.275 people lived in In-
ner Nørrebro, and the percentage of foreign-
born was 15%. There were 16.669 small 
rental dwellings. The area consists of old 
apartment houses inhabited by students and 
workers, a number of ethnic restaurants and 
small shops. The waste project in Inner Nør-
rebro comprise approximately 25 per cent 
(approx. 7700), or 29 apartment houses, 300 
shops, some schools and other public institu-
tions (Danwaste, 2002A). In 2001 15.700 
lived in Kgs. Enghave. Kgs. Enghave is an 
old working class area with small non-profit 
rental apartments. Many retired workers live 
here. The waste project should have com-
prised 6200 inhabitants but reached about 3 
– 4000 (Danwaste, 2002B). 
 
The waste management project in Inner Nør-
rebro started in 1998, and was to a large ex-
tent based on what we have termed the Dan-
ish waste management model. The main par-
ticipants in the project are the Copenhagen 
Environmental and Energy Office (KMEK), a 
local NGO, the City Council and R-98.  
 
It was initiated when a local resident, Erik 
Jørgensen, living in Eco 90 (an ecological 
apartment house) in 1997 contacted KMEK, 
which was then working with compost and 
local waste management. Together they 
made a proposal to the Nørrebro Local Coun-
cil (not existing any longer), for a project that 
they called Eco Town 1997-99, which the EU 
LIFE program supported.  
  
You may say that the difference is that Kgs. 
Enghave was a top down project and Inner 
Nørrebro more a bottom-up approach. In Kgs. 
Enghave it was R-98 that leaded the project, 
and it was not in a similar way public partici-
pation [as Inner Nørrebro]. The strategy in 
Kgs. Enghave is partly due to another de-
mography, where the inhabitants are retired 
workers and there are not so many activists 
as in Inner Nørrebro. The project in Kgs. 
Enghave had to be top down, otherwise 
things couldn’t run. The difference between 
Kgs. Enghave and Inner Nørrebro is that it is 
much more difficult to make things work, 
when it’s led from below. In Kgs. Enghave, 
where R-98 is in front, they are a part of the 
whole Copenhagen waste system, and there-
fore it is much more dependable. In Inner 
Nørrebro the system is much more vulner-
able. (Interview with Merete Kristoffersen). 
 
In four years the Inner Nørrebro waste project 
raised some 5 million DKK, from different 
funds in I.A. the Ministry of Environment for 
supporting local waste initiatives. The waste 
project in Inner Nørrebro is situated 
(organised) at KMEK where Erik Jørgensen is 
project leader for 6 – 8 project-employees. 
 
In Kgs. Enghave the citizens wanted, as a 
part of a renewal project,‘a green Kgs. 
Enghave’. None of the projects was started 
on behalf of R-98’s initiative. There were so 
many other interesting projects we could 
have cooperated together with instead. In 
Kgs. Enghave it was just another kind of 
grass root movement; it was the inhabitants 
organisations. That’s the only difference com-
pared to Inner Nørrebro. In Kgs. Enghave the 
local residents wanted to take part in waste 
projects, and hence the residents elected 
boards supports it very much. I don’t believe 
that the Inner Nørrebro model is better or 
worse. The Kgs. Enghave model is simply 
just best suited for Kgs. Enghave (social 
apartments). (Interview with Kirsten Henrik-
sen). 
 
In Kgs. Enghave the main participants were 
R-98, AKB and 3B (two non-profit building 
associations. The project leader from R-98 
partly had her fee from the Green Fund (the 
Ministry of Environment). It is a local Agenda 
21 project with a starting point in an urban 
renewal project, where citizens called for ‘a 
more green Kgs. Enghave’. The project is in 
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line with the Governments “Waste 21” from 
1998, and “Waste plan 2004” from the Co-
penhagen municipal. I spring 2003 tries R-98 
(Anita Ringsing) to raise money for the 2. 
stage comprising owner partnership flats and 
owner-occupied apartments, which BE-
BOERE they expect to become much more 
difficult (Ringsing 2003). 
 
I can’t explain why, but when we invited to a 
citizen meeting in Kgs. Enghave some 200 
persons were actually present at the meeting. 
The Renters Boards are very active even 
though its non-profit rental housing. It’s quite 
surprising, but none the less a fact. (Interview 
with Project Leader in R-98, Anita Ringsing 
2003). 
 
In Kgs. Enghave a high environmental con-
sciousness exists due to the historical fact 
that waste from Copenhagen was taken out 
here. Maybe the inhabitants in non-profit 
rental apartments haven’t a high income, but 
they got’ time’, and that can be an important’ 
resource’ in local waste projects. Profession-
als leaded the waste project in Kgs. 
Enghave;R-98, EJENDOMSFUNKTIONÆ-
RER, the Renters Boards, myself ETC. The 
public articipation in Kgs. Enghave has gone 
through the Renters Boards. We have partly 
been inspired by the Inner Nørrebro waste 
project - as well as from other places. 
(Interview with Torben Forskov, Local Green 
Guide in Kgs. Enghave, 2003). 
 
Some of the renters representatives in Kgs. 
Enghave are disappointed because parts of 
the waste projects, told to be GENNEMFØRT 
by R-98, has not been implemented. They 
have been very keen about the overall waste 
project and feel sorry to realise that it has not 
been possible to realise: 
 
I am very sorry that the source separation 
and BIOGAS project have not succeeded. R-
98 have not been able to overcome their 
promises. I’ve heard that they are driving the 
organic waste to Holbæk (70 km), and in my 
opinion the whole idea is then gone. It’s very 
disappointed now when the renters finally 
have improved. In my opinion the Copenha-
gen municipal is promising more than they 
want to realise. We, the renters, want to con-
tinue, but I have not heard about a 2. stage, 
as you are telling me about [information from 
interview with Anita Ringsing R-98]. 
(Interview with Birget Andreasen, Chairman 
in a local Renters Board and member of 
‘Green Steering Group’ in the Kgs. Enghave 
waste project). 
  
Another Chairman from a local Renters Board 
has some of the same experiences: 
 
In my opinion is it all right to talk about citizen 
involvement in the waste project. Apart from 
public participation in the ongoing urban re-
newal, where the citizens now have estab-
lished their own Agenda groups, in opposition 
to the municipal. The municipal has chosen 
projects ‘with a positive outcome’ instead of 
‘the traffic topic’ as the inhabitants has given 
highest priority. The municipal of Copenha-
gen has in my opinion not been GEARET to 
citizen involvement this far.  
 
The politicians want to improve, but many in-
habitants experiences are the opposite. It’s 
the FORVALTNING they are not used to it. 
They have always been doing that they 
wanted, and have never asked the citizens. 
They has just started to learn it. But that is in 
general and not a part of the waste project. 
We have not been in contact with themunici-
pal in the waste project. R-98 – Anita 
Ringsing – hasbeen an important person in 
the citizen involvement in Kgs. Enghave. 
(Interview with Harry Ottesen, Chairman in a 
local Renters Board and member of ‘Green 
Steering Group’ in the Kgs. Enghave waste 
project). 
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In Inner Nørrebro the renters representatives 
or Boards are also active, and have been im-
portant stakeholders in the decision and im-
plementation phase: 
 
The renters are very satisfied with the waste 
project in our building block. I believe that we 
are now approximately 65 – 75 percent who 
is taking part in the source separation project, 
but off course some is not so interested, but I 
have not received any complains. And when 
you ask if I can mention some persons who 
are critical here in our building block 
[approximately 300 apartments]. I’m afraid 
that I can’t find any names. You have to ask 
some of our employees. Those who are criti-
cal remain apparently silent. (Interview with 
Asbjørn Skytte, Chairman in a building block 
renters and owners board). 
 
Our renters [in Inner Nørrebro] are generally 
good to separate the waste, but off course 
there are also some that aren’t interested, 
and they don’t take part in the project. I be-
lieve that 3 out of 4 are active, but I have 
never met any critics, they remain apparently 
silent. When you explicitly ask for critics I can 
think of one or maybe two persons and that is 
due to the fact that I have experienced that 
they don’t separate their waste. (Interview 
with Hans Melin, EJENDOMSFUNKTIONÆR 
in Inner Nørrebro). 
 
In autumn 2001 there were established 72 
local waste stations in 26 apartment houses 
in Inner Nørrebro. It is possible for almost 
10.000 citizens to separate their waste in as 
many as 20 different types, or fractions. 16 
public institutions are taking part in the waste 
project. There have been established 169 lo-
cal composting plants, and 32 building asso-
ciation employees have taken part in an ur-
ban ecological training and education pro-
gram.  
 
 
We have raised some 16 ‘gårdmands-
stillinger’. These employee have the daily 
contact to the inhabitants and makes every 
thing work. We [KMEK] have published all our 
results. You can find it on the Internet. I be-
lieve that R-98 feels threatened by the Inner 
Nørrebro waste model. That’s the reason 
they made their own model in Kgs. Engave. 
It’s a competing top-down model, and they’re 
trying to shoot us down. I don’t understand 
why. In Kgs. Enghave it’s the system [R-98] 
that decides your choices, but we believe, in 
opposition, that citizen participation is a pre-
condition for a good result. (Interview with 
Erik Jørgensen 2002). 
 
The consultant firm, Dan Waste Consult has 
estimated the costs – for R-98 - in Inner Nør-
rebro to approximately 540 Danish kroner for 
each citizen. In other municipalities the costs 
is expected to be almost the same. The pro-
ject has been running for four years and the 
recycling percentage has increased from 17 
per cent to ca. 35 per cent, compared to the 
average for Copenhagen as a whole of some 
21 per cent (Danwaste 2002A).  
 
The inhabitants in Kgs. Enghave are very in-
terested in source separation. People are 
very interested, even though we have many 
retired workers and early retired people. 
Maybe it is conditioned by the fact that we-
have used a lot of money on our information 
material. (Interview with Anita Ringsing 2003, 
and CredoConsult 2002). 
 
In winter 2001/2002 the waste project in Kgs. 
Enghave was comprising approximately 3500 
inhabitants. The citizens can separate their 
waste in some 8 - 10 different types. The re-
cycling percentage has increased from 15 per 
cent to 32 per cent. The Kgs. Enghave model 
is much cheaper for R-98. There should have 
been established a central composting plant 
in Kgs. Enghave, but it was never realised. 
Two local waste stations were planned, but 
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are not yet realised. In a consultant report it is 
estimated that the Agenda project in Inner 
Nørrebro is approximately 3 times more ex-
pensive than Kgs. Enghave. This might be 
caused by the fact that Kgs. Enghave started 
1 – 2 years later than Inner Nørrebro, and this 
meant that Kgs.Enghave could learn from the 
Inner Nørrebro’s experiences (Danwaste 
2002B). 
 
The Inner Nørrebro has used a lot of money. 
It’s the local ILDSJÆL and project employees 
that facilitate the citizen participation and not 
the other way round. In such a perspective I 
believe that Kgs. Enghave consist of a more 
real citizen participation. Things are dealt with 
at board meetings in a democratic way, by 
democratic elected chaismen. In Kgs. 
Enghave it was also a local ILDSJÆL, almost 
as in Inner Nørrebro that initiated the waste 
project. The Nørrebro waste model is very 
expensive. They are not professional, things 
take a lot of time for grass roots. They work in 
a different way. (Interview with Kirsten Hen-
riksen R-98 2003). 
 
According to project leader Erik Jørgensen 
from Inner Nørrebro: 
 
The material to compare Kgs. Enghave and 
Inner Nørrebro was not fair, and very much in 
favour for Kgs. Enghave. It made Inner Nør-
rebro look much more expensive than it really 
is. In Sweden, where they have succeeded to 
make citizens fraction the waste, they are us-
ing much more money than we are. So you 
have to decide - in advance - in political terms 
if you want to make citizen involvement in 
waste projects.It’s correct that we are using 
the existing TAKSTER in our – the renters – 
favour; we’re only paying for the rest waste 
(DAGRENOVATION), and not the different 
fractions. But that is what we tell anyone, and 
it is just as well in order to tell the politicians 
that the existing paying system doesn’t en-
courage citizens to separate their waste. We 
have been waiting for a political decision for 
many years. (Interview with Erik Jørgensen). 
  
In a status report it is stressed that there has 
been a strong commitment from all stake-
holders; politicians, administration, citizens, 
local politicians, employees and the waste 
disposal company R-98 at Inner Nørrebro. 
The report calls for the establishment of a 
centre, something like an Agenda 21 centre, 
to coordinate the local waste and environ-
mental work, which has now been started. It 
has not been easy to start recycling proc-
esses in Inner Nørrebro. A precondition for a 
successful implementation is information and 
dialogue with the citizens Dan waste 2000A).  
 
The waste project is being evaluated in 2002 
in order to communicate the experiences to 
other interested municipalities in Europe. 
 
If I should draw a conclusion then it would be 
that I can’t tell if Inner Nørrebro or Kgs. 
Enghave is the best model which could be 
used in other places. I believe that the es-
sence in our experiences is that we must 
stress that it requires quite a loss of re-
sources to make in go.(Interview with Kirsten 
Henriksen R-98 2003). 
 
Public Accountability procedures are a politi-
cal topic (GOAL) in Denmark. It is a tradition 
for democratic procedures, or public partici-
pation, as the politician claims to keep up 
(honour). In this waste management case 
from the Copenhagen municipal, have the 
Social Democratic Party, the Social Liberal 
and some Left Winged Parties used a lot of 
money and been giving high priority to waste 
project with a high degree of citizen involve-
ment, partly to the municipal employees dis-
approval. In their opinion are that kind of pro-
jects expensive, the results limited and the 
project process vulnerable due to the fact that 
the projects often lie in the hands of a few 
ILDSJÆLE.  
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None the less must it be concluded that the 
Inner Nørrebro waste project have reached 
the highest numbers of BEBOERE, and the 
highest rate of waste separation although 
Kgs. Enghave have reached almost the per-
centage of waste separation, but not the 
same number of BEBOERE. 
 
Both waste projects are under pressure from 
the dominant societal ‘monetary rationality’. 
Perhaps can Kgs. Enghave be seen as a pro-
ject leaded more by experts or specialists, or 
a tendency against a more instrumental top-
down strategy. But at the other hand, one 
might as well claim that the demand for fur-
ther dialog has been meet in a rational or 
pragmatic way in Kgs. Enghave. (to the pro-
posed preface: environ discourse.doc). 
 
Experiences from Sweden points at the fact 
that successful citizen involvement assume 
(presume) high project costs and a time-
consuming process, and this is perhaps the 
most important experience the administrative 
employees are now facing – also in Kgs. 
Enghave, where the implementation process 
have shown itself to be much more time-
consuming than first estimated to. 
 
Public accountability 
issues 
 
In my personal opinion the Copenhagen mu-
nicipal is too much involved in the waste col-
lector company (R-98). R-98 is so big that it’s 
hard to change things. We miss some diver-
sity in their solutions to different places. They 
have only one system and that’s all. As a citi-
zen in the municipal am I although quite 
pleased with how things run, but there ought 
to be more opportunities, not just in a few 
project areas. We [DN] have some concrete 
proposals, inspired from Sweden, but we be-
lieve that it’s almost impossible to get through 
with such proposals. An example is I.E. that 
the tender material - to R-98 - is partly made 
by R-98 themselves. It is simply not good 
enough. (Interview with Erik Jacobsen) 
 
The local Copenhagen Committee in DN took 
part in the decision process with “Waste Plan 
2004”. But the local committee hasn’t good 
experiences with stakeholder involvement in 
Copenhagen. The Copenhagen municipality 
made a public hearing period, before the law 
proposal, where the local committee in DN 
were asked which proposals they could have. 
However: 
 
In our opinion there wasn’t changed so much 
as a comma in the draft proposal, despite our 
suggestions. In the following hearing phase 
for “Waste Plan 2004” we made a compre-
hensive objection; in our opinion Waste Plan 
2004 wasn’t ambitious enough. They had not 
involved experiences from Inner Nørrebro 
and other places. They did only what they 
wanted to in advance. We are being heard 
because we are supposed to. Sometimes we 
get the impression that some parts of our pro-
posals are incorporated in the next genera-
tion waste plan. So in a way we have some 
influence - in a long perspective, but we are 
often deeply frustrated as citizens and as a 
popular organisation, when we realise that 
they haven’t changed as much as a comma. 
That is our general perception of hearing 
phases, of our objections and of our authority 
contact. We have perhaps been heard – as 
supposed to, but we can’t change anything. 
(Interview with Erik Jacobsen). 
 
An example from the proposal from the Local 
DN Committee is F.EX: 
 
Information is an important aspect of “Waste 
21” and hence in the Copenhagen waste 
plans. Focused and effective information is 
very expensive. … [But] among the Local DN 
Committees members finds quite a lot of the 
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members it hard to separate their waste. We 
find that there are an obvious need for more 
information. Due to the many different sec-
tions of the population in Copenhagen must 
information come through many different 
channels and projects.(The Local DN Com-
mittee in Copenhagen 2000). 
 
The opposition in the City Council (Liberal 
and Conservative) were not satisfied with 
“Waste Plan 2004”. In a minority statement in 
“Waste Plan 2004” they claims that it is too 
ambitious, and that the implementation of its 
proposals would be too expensive: 
 
The Conservative (C) and the Liberal Party 
can’t accept the waste plan in it’s present 
form. C and the liberal do not support targets 
about rising the reuse per cent. We don’t 
want ‘reuse-no-matter-what’, only when it’s 
rational in economic terms. (Helle Sjelle (C) & 
Preben Bille Brahe (the Liberale), quated 
from: The municipal of Copenhagen 2001) 
 
The conditions following this minority state-
ment in “Waste Plan 2004” has the Waste 
Disposal Company R-98’s experiences in this 
way: 
 
Now we have planned three local Agenda 21 
centre in Copenhagen; which is fine, but it 
has for a long time been very difficult to get 
money to project including citizen participa-
tion, from the politicians – and I don’t believe 
that it’s getting easier now. But the Agenda 
Centre has not the needed knowledge about 
what each apartment house needs or the suf-
ficient information about the waste disposal 
Company (R-98). It would have been better if 
we (R-98) could continue to employ local pro-
ject leaders to facilitate local waste and reuse 
projects. But the politicians claims that we 
need to save; we don’t have the money. It’s 
been in that manner for many years. Conser-
vative and the Liberal in the municipal has not 
the majority, but they do create a certain 
’mentality’;now we must do things more effec-
tively. They can’t accept that the waste plan 
costs more money, and then it becomes very 
difficult for us to say that we need more 
money. The former Mayor (from the Socialist 
party) was under the same pressure in the 
90’s. We know what to do, but we don’t get 
the money to the projects. It’s not so much 
the Social Democrats, although they as well 
want to do thing in as cheap way as possible. 
That’s what everybody wants – of course. 
(Interview with Kirsten Henriksen) 
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